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The three essays in this dissertation mainly focus on immigrant women’s labor supply behaviors, 
time allocation with children and the impact of E-Verify policy on immigrants’ home ownership. 
Asian immigrants have grown as a share of the US population during the past decade and are 
expected to be the nation’s largest immigrant group in 2055. Asian immigrants are not just 
adding numbers in the population, but also affecting labor market, raising and educating the next 
generation, and making a sizable contribution to housing market. In the first essay, using the data 
from the American Community Survey (ACS) 1-year estimates from 2006 to 2011, Asian 
immigrant women’s labor supply behaviors are examined by comparing them with other 
immigrant women and native women’s labor supply behaviors and investigating the possible 
determinants of Asian immigrants’ labor supply behaviors. The results show that native non-
Asian women having children under age five in the household work less hours than native Asian 
women and Asian first-generation immigrant women who have children under age five. 
Moreover, having more than two adults (e.g. grandparents) rather than themselves or their 
spouse, both native Asian women and Asian first-generation immigrant women spend more time 
in work market than native non-Asian women. It means that extra adults in the household share 
in the division of labor in the family so that native Asian women and Asian first-generation 
immigrant women can focus more on the work outside of the home rather than unpaid 
housework. Also, compared to native non-Asian women and native Asian women, Asian first-
generation immigrant women have lower employment rates and are less responsive to hourly 
wage and spouses’ hourly wages. It is also observed that the country of origin has effects on 
immigrants’ labor supply behaviors. Married women from male-dominated societies work fewer 
hours than other Asian immigrant women. In the second essay, the 2005-2011 American Time 
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Use Survey (ATUS) is used to analyze immigrant women’s time allocation with their children, 
which is also linked to data files from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to offer more 
information about each individual. The results indicate that working immigrant women spend 
more time on educational child care than working native women; and highly educated women 
are spending more hours on educational child care. Both working and non-working immigrant 
women spent less time on leisure than native women. The last essay uses data from the American 
Community Survey (ACS) 1-year estimates during the period 2004-2015 to examine whether E-
Verify mandates have an impact on immigrants’ housing decisions in the states that adopted the 
E-Verify mandates, compared to those without E-Verify mandates. A difference-in-differences 
methodology (DID) is used to analyze the data. E-Verify mandates are used to help employers 
verify the employment eligibility of newly hired employees and reduce the unauthorized 
immigrant workers in the United States. While E-Verify mandates affect unauthorized immigrant 
workers’ employment, they also have significantly negative impacts on all immigrants’ 
employment and home ownership. Immigrants living in the states that adopted E-Verify 
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The population of Asian immigrants increased from 491,000 in 1960 to about 17.6 million 
in 2016, representing a 3,476 percent increase. Looking forward, the Pew Research Center 
projected that Asian immigrants would eventually become the nation’s largest immigrant group, 
surpassing Hispanics in 2055, and making up 38% of all U.S. immigrants. Meanwhile, 
immigrants play an important role in the labor market, housing market, and being parents 
educating next generation. This paper mainly focuses on immigrants and examines their labor 
supply behaviors, time allocation with children, and how E-Verify mandates impact and change 
immigrants’ home ownership. 
In the first essay, using the data from the American Community Survey (ACS) 1-year 
estimates from 2006 to 2011, the labor supply behaviors among Asian first-generation immigrant 
(AI) women, native Asian (AN) women, native non-Asian (ON) women and non-Asian 
immigrant (OI) women are examined and compared; the effect of having more adults in the 
household with children is explored; and the labor supply behaviors of women born in the male-
dominated countries are examined. OLS regression, 2SLS regression and logistic regression are 
used to analyze the data. The results show that Asian first-generation immigrant (AI) women 
have significantly different labor supply behaviors from others. Married AI women have lower 
own and cross wage elasticities than ON women with a high school degree or less, but higher 
elasticities than ON women with some college education and college graduates.  This suggests 
that with lower education levels, married AI women’s labor supply behaviors do not respond to 
their own wage and their spouse’s wage as much as ON women’s. The results also show that in 
households with children, having more than two adults rather than themselves or their spouses, 
AI women and AN women spend much more time in market work, while ON women work 
2 
 
fewer hours under the same conditions. This means that extra adults in the AI and AN women’s 
household share in the division of labor in the family so that they can focus more on the work out 
of home rather than unpaid housework. In addition, married women from male-dominated 
societies, such as Japan, Korea and India, work fewer hours than other Asian immigrant women.  
This suggests that immigrant women from these male-dominated societies conform to gendered 
care-taking roles. 
The second essay investigates the different time allocation with children between 
immigrant and native mothers.  It also explores the different time allocations between immigrant 
and native women among all time use categories. Previous research has shown that the allocation 
of time with children plays an important role in the development of human capital and the 
subsequent socioeconomic status that will be transmitted from generation to generation. Also, 
Becker (1991) states that the time parents spend with their children can be seen as investments 
into the production of child quality. In the second essay, the 2005-2011 American Time Use 
Survey (ATUS) is used to analyze immigrant women’s time allocation with their children and 
their daily time use. The results demonstrate that, on average, immigrant women do not spend as 
much time as native women on total child care, but working immigrant women do spend more 
time with their children on educational child care than working native women. Meanwhile, as 
expected, higher education levels are related to more hours spent on educational child care for 
both native women and immigrant women. In terms of all time use categories, the results show 
that marital status is associated with women’s time use. Non-working women who are married 
spend more hours on child care and on nonmarket work than other non-working women who are 
not married, and, similar to non-working women, working women who are married spend more 
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time on nonmarket work than other working women who are not married. Meanwhile, married 
women lose their leisure time since they spend more time on nonmarket work with limited time. 
In the last essay, using data from the American Community Survey (ACS) 1-year estimates 
during the period 2004-2015 and difference-in-differences methodology (DID), the study 
examines whether E-Verify mandates have an impact on immigrants’ housing decisions in the 
states that adopted the E-Verify mandates compared to states without mandates. Even though E-
Verify intends primarily to prevent illegal immigrants from obtaining employment illegally in 
the United States, it has unavoidable and unintended effects on all immigrants, including the 
legal immigrants. Some legal immigrants or natives have household members, like siblings, 
parents, or a spouse, who are unauthorized. The legal immigrants or natives may have to leave 
the state and relocate their homes due to the E-Verify mandates’ impact on their unauthorized 
family members. The results confirm that E-Verify mandates reduce the probability of 
immigrants’ home ownership. Immigrant living in the states that adopted E-Verify mandates are 
less likely to own homes, or purchase houses there. Additionally, E-Verify mandates have 
significantly negative effects on immigrants’ labor force participation as well. 
Overall, the first two essays of this dissertation show how Asian immigrant women, as 
members of the model minority, differ from other immigrant women and native women.  The 
final chapter examines how policies designed to prevent illegal immigrants from working have 
unintended consequences.  
Married Asian first-generation immigrant women work significantly more hours than other 
immigrant women and, having extra adults in the household, Asian first-generation immigrant 
women are more likely to work more hours than native women and other immigrant women. 
This suggests that Asian cultural preferences contribute to them being the “model immigrants.”  
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Also, working immigrant women spend more time on educational child care than working native 
women. Especially, lower educated immigrant women spend more time on educational child care 
then lower educated native women. The investments in children will contribute to the next 
generation’s educational attainments and affect their roles in the US economy. Moreover, E-
Verify mandates significantly reduce the possibility of immigrants’ home ownership in the states 
that adopted E-Verify in the specific years. These unintended consequences will create a drag on 
economic growth in the states that adopted this policy since housing is such a large sector in the 
US economy.  
Taken together, these essays provide a more complete understanding of the role of all 




2. ASIAN IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S LABOR SUPPLY 
2.1 Introduction 
          The foreign-born
1
 population from Asian countries is the U.S.’s second largest immigrant 
population by the world region of birth, behind those from Latin America. According to the 
American Community Survey 2013, one-year estimates, in the United States there are a total of 
12,176,983 foreign-born people from Asian countries, 53.4 percent of which are women. 
Meanwhile, about 2.55 percent of the total population (316,128,839) in the United States is 
native-born
2
 Asian women. In 2013, the Bureau of Labor Statistics
3
 (BLS) projects that Asians in 
the labor force will increase by about 2.0 million during the 2012-2022 period and the share of 
Asians in the 2022 labor force is expected to be 6.2 percent, and definitely, about half of this 
increase comes from women. It is obvious that the increase in the number of Asian women in the 
workforce reflects their continued high immigration and very high labor force participation rate. As a 
model minority group, it has been shown that Asian-Americans place a greater value in marriage, 
education, parenthood, hard work and career success (Pew Research Center, 2012). As Asian-
Americans have a very high labor force participation rate, it is important to examine the difference in 
labor supply behaviors among Asian first-generation immigrant women, native Asian women, native 
non-Asian women and non-Asian immigrant women, and to investigate the reasons why they are 
different. 
                                                 
1
 The U.S. Census bureau defines the foreign-born as individuals who had no U.S. citizenship at birth. The foreign 
born population includes naturalized citizens, lawful permanent residents, refugees, asylums, legal nonimmigrants 
(including those on student, work, or certain other types of temporary visas), and persons residing in the country 
without authorization. 
2
 The native-born population includes anyone who was a U.S. citizen at birth. The native population includes those 
born in the United States, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Marianas, or the U.S. Virgin Islands, 
as well as those born abroad of at least one U.S. citizen parent. 
3
 See http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ecopro.pdf. 
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          To explore Asian women’s labor supply behavior, four groups of women are mainly 
examined in the paper, including Asian first-generation immigrant women (AI)
4
, native Asian 
women (AN), native non-Asian women (other natives) (ON) and non-Asian immigrant women 
(other immigrants) (OI). Table 2-1 shows the definition for each group of women. The “AN 
women” group is defined as women whose race is Asian but are born in the United States. “AI 
women”, are women whose race is Asian but are born in the Asian countries. “ON women” are 
women who are not Asian but are born in the United States. “OI women” are foreign-born 
women that are not Asian, and are not born in the Asian countries. Note that women, who were 
Asian but born neither in the United States nor in any Asian countries, are not included in the 
sample (19,484 married women and 6,166 single women).  
Table 2-1 The Definitions of Asian First-generation Immigrant Women, Native Asian 
Women, Native Non-Asian Women and Non-Asian Immigrant Women. 
 Four Groups of Women 
Born in 
the U.S. 
Born in Asian 
Countries Race 
Asian first-generation immigrant women (AI) No Yes Asian 
Native Asian women (AN) Yes No Asian 
Native non-Asian women (ON) Yes No Various 
Non-Asian immigrant women (OI) No No Not Asian 
          AI, AN, ON and OI women show very interesting and various labor supply behaviors. 
According to 2013 American Community Survey one-year estimates (see Figure 2-1), 78.15 
percent of AN women are employed compared with 72.02 percent of ON women. 
Comparatively, the employment rates of AI women (67.42%) and OI women (62.38%) are 
lower. “Not in labor force” rates are 28.37 percent for AI, and 31.28 percent for OI women, 
which are much higher than that of AN women. Even though AI women and AN women are all 
Asian and have many similar behaviors, based on these data, their employment status show a few 
                                                 
4
  These abbreviations will be used for this chapter. 
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differences that AI women have much higher “not in labor force” rates and lower employment 
rates than AN women. 
Source: 2013 American Community Survey one-Year Estimates. 
Figure 2-1 Women’s Employment Status by Four Groups. 
 
          In general, women’s labor supply behaviors have important implications for marriage, 
fertility, child care, education levels and male-female wage differentials. Figure 2-2 shows that 
women’s marital status in the four groups. Most of the AI women and OI women are married
5
, of 
which the marriage rate are 78.8 percent and 65.28 percent, respectively. The marriage rates of 
these two groups of women are higher than that of ON women and AN women. A large number 
of AN women are never married
6
, about 35.78 percent, are “no longer married”
7
. The “no longer 
married” rates of both OI women and ON women are about twice as high as that of AN women 
and AI women. For marital status, AN women and AI women have very similar and lower “no 
longer married” rates. The stability of marriage may affect women’s labor supply. In terms of 
educational attainment, as shown in Figure 2-3, 57.1 percent of AN women have some college 
education and 50.07 percent of ON women have the same educational attainments.  But, only 
                                                 
5
 Married: includes now married spouse present and now married spouse absent. 
6
 Never married: includes single. 
7
 No longer married: includes divorced, widowed, and separated. 
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12.89 percent of ON women have college graduate education, compared with 25.21 percent of 
AN women and 23.02 percent of AI women. Unsurprisingly, AN women and AI women have 
higher educational attainments; OI women have the lowest educational attainments among all 
other groups of women. Additionally, according to ACS 2013 one-year estimates, 5.3 percent of 
Asian women gave birth in the past 12 month, compared with 5 percent of White alone women 
which is only part of ON women. With higher educational attainments, lower fertility rates, 
lower “no longer married” rates, I expect that AN women and AI women have significantly 
different labor supply behaviors from ON women and OI women.  
Source: 2013 American Community Survey one-Year Estimates. 
Note: Married includes now married spouse present and now married spouse absent; never married includes single; no longer 
married includes divorced, widowed, and separated. 
 




Source: 2013 American Community Survey one-Year Estimates. 
 
Figure 2-3 Educational Attainment by Race. 
 
          Since unmarried women’s labor supply is very similar to unmarried men’s, much of the 
literature on women’s labor supply has focused on married women’s labor supply. However, 
there is a limited literature that compares the labor supply behaviors among AI women, AN 
women, ON women and OI women. In this paper, married women’s labor supply behaviors are 
primarily studied because changes in the labor supply behaviors of married women have driven 
the changes in labor supply for women overall (Blau and Kahn 2006). Single women’s labor 
supply behaviors are also examined. I will investigate the different labor supply behaviors among 
AI women, AN women, ON women and OI women.  
          This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents previous literature; Section 3 describes 
data and descriptive statistics; and Section 4 describes the model I used to analyze the data. In 





          Immigrant women’s labor supply behaviors have been researched widely by economists. 
The early and ongoing research uses culture to explain variation in economic outcomes of 
immigrants. Fernández and Fogli (2006, 2009) use past female labor force participation and total 
fertility rates from the women’s country of ancestry as cultural proxies and conclude that culture 
is more likely to play an important role in explaining the second generation immigrant women’s 
work and fertility. This is consistent with Reimers (1985) and Antecol (2000) who find that 
cultural factors play a role in explaining inter-ethnic variation in immigrant women’s labor force 
participation rates. Gevrek, Z., Gevrek D. and Gupta (2011) also use relative women’s labor 
force participation and total fertility rates in the women’s country of ancestry as cultural proxies, 
and find that culture matters for the women’s labor supply. More importantly, they show that the 
impact of culture proxies is significantly larger for women with immigrant parents who share 
same ethnic background than for those with intermarried parents.  
          Other literature shows the other possible factors that may affect married immigrant 
women’s labor supply. Antecol and Bedard (2002) examine the effect of cohabitation on married 
immigrant women’s decision to work in the United States. They find that cohabitation with 
parents or parents-in-law allows married immigrant women to share childcare and other 
household responsibilities, which increases the probability of working outside the home. In 
particular, the cohabitation effect is much larger among immigrants from Asia. Blau, Kahn and 
Papps (2008) show that there is a positive impact of source country characteristics on the labor 
supply assimilation profiles of married adult immigrant women by using 1980, 1990 and 2000 
Census data. Immigrant women from countries where women have high relative labor force 
participation rates work substantially more than women coming from countries with lower 
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relative female labor supply rates. Their paper focuses on married women who immigrated as 
adults, age 18 or over. By using U.S. 1980 Census data, Duleep and Sanders (1993) indicate that 
both the labor force participation of married Asian immigrant women and European and 
Canadian married immigrants are affected by whether their husbands invest in skills specific to 
the U.S. labor market. 
          In terms of all immigrant women in the United States, in previous literature Schoeni (1998) 
uses 1990 Census data to state that immigrant women were less likely to participate in the labor 
force than native women, and this gap increased to 7 percentage points by 1990. His findings 
show that more-educated women are much more likely to participate in the labor force, and U.S.-
born women are more educated than immigrant women. Immigrant women in this paper are not 
limited to Asian immigrant women. In this paper it also states that immigrant women who were 
born in the United Kingdom and Canada, Europe, Japan, Korea, China, the Philippines, and the 
Middle East have had steady or improved wages and unemployment relative to U.S.-born 
women.  
          Although it is not a surprise that AI women, AN women, ON women and OI women have 
different labor supply behaviors due to various social and economic reasons, it would be an 
interesting to determine the possible factors that cause the difference among these women, 
specially, between AN women and ON women. Obviously, for AN women, their higher 
education, lower divorce rates, and higher income may be correlated with their higher 
employment rates. Besides that, I want to explore whether more adults in the household with 
children will be related to their labor supply and support them to work more hours annually, and 
test if other groups of women have the same support of other adults at home as AN women. Also, 
AI women will be divided into different groups by their country of birth, in order to determine 
12 
 
whether those born in the male-dominated countries have significantly different labor supply 
behaviors than those who were born in the other countries with more gender equality. Moreover, 
years in the United States should affect immigrant women’s labor supply behaviors. 
          In my paper, I expect to see that married AI women and married AN women’s labor 
supply are significantly positively related to having more adults with children in the household 
and the labor supply behavior of AI women differ by the country of origin because of cultural 
differences.  
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
          To investigate Asian immigrant women’s labor supply, I use six years (2006 – 2011) of 
the American Community Survey (ACS) one-year estimates in my paper. ACS one-year 
estimates offer very large populations and more current data than 3-year and 5-year estimates. I 
focus on AI women, AN women, ON women and OI women aged 25-55, both married and 
single. These women are more likely to have a stable and legal job in the United States.  AI 
women in this paper include women who came from, or are descended from, East Asia like 
China (including Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau), Japan, Korea; Southeast Asia like Brunei, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam; and 
Southwest Asia like Afghanistan, India, Iran, Maldives, Nepal, specifically. Most of those Asian 
countries are the top immigrant-sending countries in the United States.
8
 Table 2-2 shows the 
foreign born population from the Asia immigrant-sending countries in the United States.  
          In the sample there are a total of 1,861,227 married women including 1,531,317 ON 
women, 104,074 AI women, 18,688 AN women, and 207,148 OI women. Among all the single 
                                                 
8
 Camarota (2012). “Immigrants in the United States,” Center for Immigration Studies. Table 4-4. Top 20 
Immigrant-Sending Countries, 1990, 2000, 2010. 
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women, there are 538,228 ON women, 20,217 AI women, 12,441 AN women and 75,375 OI 
women. 
          The dependent variables of interest are annual work hours. Annual work hours are the 
product of usual hours worked per week and weeks worked per year. Individuals with zero work 
hours are included as well. Additionally, I also investigate labor force participation (i.e. working 
positive hours). Figure 2-4 indicates that annual hours of AN women in labor supply is the 
highest among subgroups of married women. Disaggregating by education, the graph shows a 
roughly similar pattern for each education group within which AN women work more hours 
annually than any other subgroups of married women. But, even being Asian, AI women’s 
annual hours are slightly lower than both ON women and AN women. OI women work less than 
others. The same interesting pattern prevails among married women with children under age 5, 
and it is still true when I consider age groups separately. 
 
Note: Sample includes those with zero as well as positive work hours. 
 
Figure 2-4 Annual Hours Distribution for Selected Groups of Married Women. 
 
Asian First-generation Immigrant Native Asian Women 
Non-Asian Immigrant Women Native non-Asian Women 
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Table 2-2 Place of Birth for the Asia Foreign-Born Population in the United States. 
Place of Birth Population in the United States Percent of Total Population 
Total: 40,917,701   
Asia: 12,176,983 29.76% 
Eastern Asia: 3,803,484 9.30% 
China: 2,383,831 5.83% 
China, excluding Hong Kong and Taiwan 1,804,965 4.41% 
Hong Kong 213,034 0.52% 
Taiwan 365,832 0.89% 
Japan 339,970 0.83% 
Korea 1,070,335 2.62% 
Other Eastern Asia 9,348 0.02% 
South Central Asia: 3,285,550 8.03% 
Afghanistan 67,169 0.16% 
Bangladesh 203,179 0.50% 
India 2,034,677 4.97% 
Iran 363,972 0.89% 
Kazakhstan 26,334 0.06% 
Nepal 87,456 0.21% 
Pakistan 342,603 0.84% 
Sri Lanka 51,268 0.13% 
Uzbekistan 48,197 0.12% 
Other South Central Asia 60,695 0.15% 
South Eastern Asia: 4,032,035 9.85% 
Cambodia 164,746 0.40% 
Indonesia 94,600 0.23% 
Laos 196,154 0.48% 
Malaysia 68,956 0.17% 
Burma 116,775 0.29% 
Philippines 1,843,989 4.51% 
Singapore 31,293 0.08% 
Thailand 233,547 0.57% 
Vietnam 1,281,010 3.13% 
Other South Eastern Asia 965 0.00% 
Western Asia: 1,010,465 2.47% 
Iraq 200,894 0.49% 
Israel 127,079 0.31% 
Jordan 65,618 0.16% 
Kuwait 22,731 0.06% 
Lebanon 124,256 0.30% 
Saudi Arabia 88,894 0.22% 
Syria 78,934 0.19% 
Yemen 40,548 0.10% 
Turkey 109,667 0.27% 
Armenia 79,122 0.19% 
Other Western Asia 72,722 0.18% 
Asia,n.e.c. 45,449 0.11% 
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          The most basic and important independent variable is hourly wages. It is defined as annual 
salary earnings divided by annual work hours for wages and salary workers. We consider hourly 
wage observations as invalid if they are less than $2 or greater than $200 per hour in 1999 dollars 
using the Personal Consumption Expenditures price index from the National Income and Product 
Market Accounts (see http://www.bea.gov). For non-workers, the self-employed and those with 
invalid wage observations, wages are imputed using a regression approach. The non-workers 
receive predicted wages based on the regression using those working 1-13 weeks sample because 
the imputation analysis show that non-workers group has very similar background to the workers 
who work 1-13 weeks. The self-employed workers and those with invalid wage observations 
were imputed hourly wages using the regression corresponding to the weeks they worked. This 
imputation is similar to that proposed by Juhn (1992), Juhn and Murphy (1997) and Blau and 
Kahn (2007). Appendix Table 2-14 compares own and spouse education, age, and number of 
own children in the household, number of children under age 5, between the samples of non-
workers and those working 1-13 weeks per year. The difference of these variables across the two 
groups shows that it is reasonable and appropriate to use the working 1-13 weeks group to 
estimate the wages of non-workers. 
          There are other independent variables used to test the changes of the immigrant women’s 
labor supply behaviors, such as the number of children in the household, the number of children 
under age 5 in the household, age, age squared, years in the United States. Years in the United 
States are only used when I focus on AI women and OI women. Another dummy variable is 
created to control for whether there is more than one adult in the household with children for 
single women, or whether there are more than two adults in the household with children for 
married women. Also, there are several dummy variables indicating educational attainment. 
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Educational attainment falls into one of the following levels: less than grade 12, grade 12, some 
college years, or college graduate. I create dummy variables for census years and birth place if 
born in Asia, including China (the omitted category), Japan, Korea, Philippines, Vietnam, India, 
and else. For married women, spouse’s age and educational attainment will be included as well. 
          Table 2-5 and Table 2-6 provide descriptive statistics on dependent variable and some of 
the key explanatory variables for single women and married women respectively, including 
women’s own wages, spouse’s wages, nonwage income, number of own children, number of 
children under age 5 in the household, education attainments, whether more than one adult in the 
household with children for single women, whether more than two adults in the household with 
children for married women and years in the United State. In each table, column 1 and 2 report 
the descriptive statistics of AI women in the sample; column 3 and 4 report the descriptive 
statistics of AN women; column 5 and 6 report the descriptive statistics of ON women; column 7 
and 8 report the descriptive statistics of OI women. In Table 2-5 it shows that the annual work 
hours of single AN women are, on average, 1669.650 hours, which is the highest one among four 
subgroups of women. In Table 2-6, it represents that married AN women work 1476.610 hours 
annually on average, which is also the highest one among four subgroups of women. On average, 
AN women and AI women’s wages are higher than other subgroups of women’s, as well as their 
spouse’s wages. 
          I describe the method I am investigating and empirically testing in the next section. 
2.4 Empirical Methodology 
          For empirical procedure, I use several methods to test AI women and AN women’s labor 
supply behaviors, including OLS estimates, 2SLS estimates with instrumental variables, labor 
force participation estimates and subgroup analysis. The dependent variables is annual work 
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hours, in addition to the key wage and other income variables, I control in all single/married 
specifications for own (and spouse if married) age and age squared; eight Census region 
dummies; a metropolitan area dummy; own (and spouse if married) educational attainments; own 
(and spouse if married) dummies for black non-Hispanic, other race non-Hispanic, and Hispanic 
origin (with white non-Hispanic the omitted category) for ON women; and census year dummies. 
          First, I use OLS, 2SLS, and labor force participation estimates to test the different labor 
supply behaviors among four groups of women by controlling AI women, AN women, and ON 
women (with OI women the omitted category). Second, I examine labor supply behaviors for 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.4.1 OLS Regression 
          OLS regression was estimated to examine AN women and AI women’s labor supply 
behaviors separately for single women and married women. This model is run for all 
single/married women, and also for eight different subgroups of women, such as single/married 
AI women, single/married AN women, single/married ON women and single/married OI women, 
to compare their labor supply behaviors by different influence factors.                                                                                                                    
          The empirical models are given by: 
                 Hi = α + β1 * lnWi + β3 * Ii + β4 * Di + εi                                                       (2.1) 
                 Hi = α + β1 * lnWi + β2 * lnWs + β3 * Ii + β4 * Di + εi                                    (2.2) 
          Where the dependent variable Hi is the annual work hours by a woman i
9
. Wi is the wage 
rate (the wage rate was computed as total annual salary earnings divided by annual work hours) 
of the woman i, whereas Ws is the wage rate of the woman i’s spouse s if the woman i married.  Ii 
is the non-labor market income of a woman i in the Model (2.1) or the family non-labor market 
income of a woman i in the Model (2.2).  Di includes all other control variables for each woman 
i.  εi is the error term for individual i.  
          Model (2.1) is the traditional simple static labor supply model in which β1 indicates the 
impact of a wage increase for a woman i, and β3 is the income effects. Di indicates variables such 
as age, age squared, years in the United States, dummy variables for the number of children in 
the household, the number of children under age 5 in the household d and whether more than one 
                                                 
9
 Borjas (2008) points out that the labor supply curve becomes more elastic the longer the time period over which 
the hours worked variable is defined. Labor supply is almost completely inelastic when I use the weekly hours as a 
variable. So I use the usual hours worked per year instead of the usual hours worked per week. 
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adult in the household with children for single women, and dummy variables for educational 
attainments of a woman i. Also, there are other dummy variables indicating that birth place of AI 
women. I use Model (2.1) to estimate single women’s labor supply behaviors. 
          According to unitary preference approach, Model (2.2) is used to estimate married family 
labor supply behaviors. For each woman i, her labor supply depends not only on non-labor 
income (Ii), her own wage rate (Wi), but also on her spouse’s wage rate (Ws). β1 and β3 in the 
Model (2.2) have the same meaning as that in the Model (2.1), while β2, in the Model (2.2), 
indicates the impact of a wage increase for the woman i’s spouse s. In this case, I include the 
number of children under age 5 in the household and the number of children in the household as 
independent variables. There is one more dummy variable indicating that if there are more than 
two adults in the household with children. 
          Theoretically, in the Model (2.1) the income effect implies that an increase in non-labor 
income, holding the wage rate constant, reduces hours of work. However, an increase in the 
wage rate may lead to an increase or a decrease in hours of work due to the relationship between 
the substitution effect and the income effect. Model (2.2) shows the same income effect as 
Model (2.1). But in the Model (2.2) the cross-substitution effects of wife’s and husband’s leisure 
time should be considered if there is an increase in the wage rate of a woman i (Ashenfelter and 
Heckman 1974). The increase in the labor force participation rates of women could be due not 
only to a rise in the market wage but also to a decline in women’s reservation wages. Also, an 
increase in the number of children in the household will likely increase women’s reservation 
wages and reduce the probability that the women will work. Due to the decline of fertility, 
women labor force participation increases. In the opposite direction, women work more not 
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because they have fewer children, rather, they have fewer children because the rising wage 
induces them to reduce their time in the household sector and enter the labor market
10
.  
2.4.2 2SLS Regression 
          In labor supply analysis, there are two serious issues: one is measurement error, the other 
one is omitted variables. The American Community Survey provides annual personal salary 
earnings instead of hourly wages, so the wage variable is computed by dividing annual salary 
earnings by annual work hours for wages and salary workers. If there is measurement error in 
annual work hours then the coefficient on that variable in OLS regression will be biased toward 
zero. In addition, unobserved factors may be correlated with wages and labor supply. Thus, 
researchers use instrumental variable to control for the endogeneity of wages in labor supply 
models (Baker and Benjamin 1997; Juhn and Murphy 1997; Blau et al. 2003; Blau and Kahn 
2007).           
          In this paper, I estimate single/married women’s labor supply model by using IV with own 
wage for single women model, and with own wages and spouse’s wage for married women 
model each considered endogenous in the models, used in Blau and Kahn (2007). 
          The empirical two-stage least squares for single women model are given by: 
              In the first stage:    ln?̂?i = α0 + α1 * Ei + α2 * Ci + δi                     (2.3) 
              In the second stage:   Hi = β0 + β1 * ln?̂?i + β3 * Ii + β4 * Di + εi   (2.4) 
                    Where ln?̂?i  is an endogenous variable. 
                                                 
10
 Angrist and Evans, “Children and Their Parents’ Labor Supply: Evidence from Exogenous Variation in Family 
Size,” American Economic Review 88 (June 1998): 450-77. 
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          The empirical two-stage least squares for married women model are given by: 
              In the first stage:    ln?̂?i = α0 + α1 * Ei + α2 * Es + α3 * Ci + δi   (2.5) 
                                             ln?̂?s= α0 + α1 * Ei + α2 * Es + α3 * Cs + δs   (2.6) 
             In the second stage:  Hi = β0 + β1 * ln?̂?i + β2 * ln?̂?s + β3 * Ii + β4 * Di + εi   (2.7) 
          Where ln?̂?i and ln?̂?s are endogenous variables. 
         In the first stage, region dummies and a dummy for Metro areas are included for both 
single and married women. Own and spouse educational attainments are included in the first 
stage log wage regression for married women, and only own educational attainments are 
included for single women. As a result, in the labor supply models I do not control for schooling. 
In the second stage, like the OLS regression, the dependent variable Hi is the annual work hours 
by a woman i
11
. Wi is the wage rate of the woman i, and Ws is the wage rate of the woman i’s 
spouse s if the woman i married. Ii is the non-labor market income of a woman i in the single 
women model and the family non-labor market income of a woman i in the married women 
model.  Di includes all other control variables for each woman i, except schooling. εi is the error 
term for individual i.  
          The result of single women is statistically significant and F (22, 646260) = 3376.24, 
p<0.0001; the result for married women is statistically significant and F (25, 1861226) = 
7967.64, p<0.0001. Table 2-5 shows the first stage estimates for single women and Table 2-6 
presents the first stage estimates for married women.  
                                                 
11
 Borjas (2008) points out that the labor supply curve becomes more elastic the longer the time period over which 
the hours worked variable is defined. Labor supply is almost completely inelastic when I use the weekly hours as a 
variable. So I use the usual hours worked per year instead of the usual hours worked per week. 
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Grade 12 0.226** 0.181** 0.224** 0.26** 0.226** 
 
(0.005) (0.017) (0.037) (0.003) (0.005) 
Some college 0.607** 0.605** 0.599** 0.609** 0.607** 
 
(0.005) (0.016) (0.035) (0.003) (0.005) 
College graduate 1.011** 0.892** 0.907** 0.995** 1.011** 
  (0.007) (0.017) (0.037) (0.003) (0.007) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. All models include eight region dummies, a metropolitan area dummy. 
      **  Denotes significance at 1% 
 
Table 2-6 Married Women 2SLS First Stage Estimates. 
  ALL AI Women AN Women ON Women OI Women 
Dependent Variable: Own log wages       
Grade 12 0.277** 0.172** 0.263** 0.262** 0.203** 
 
(0.002) (0.008) (0.034) (0.002) (0.003) 
Some college 0.586** 0.550** 0.568** 0.559** 0.525** 
 
(0.002) (0.008) (0.033) (0.002) (0.003) 
College graduate 0.963** 0.917** 0.938** 0.937** 0.904** 
 
(0.002) (0.009) (0.034) (0.003) (0.005) 
Spouse Grade 12 0.133** 0.066** 0.117** 0.115** 0.098** 
 
(0.002) (0.009) (0.029) (0.002) (0.003) 
Spouse Some college 0.218** 0.175** 0.235** 0.195** 0.213** 
 
(0.002) (0.009) (0.028) (0.002) (0.003) 
Spouse College graduate 0.275** 0.238** 0.288** 0.253** 0.301** 
  (0.002) (0.009) (0.029) (0.002) (0.005) 
Dependent Variable: Spouse's log wages       
Grade 12 0.176** 0.112** 0.185** 0.135** 0.111** 
 
(0.002) (0.009) (0.037) (0.003) (0.004) 
Some college 0.259** 0.257** 0.274** 0.204** 0.235** 
 
(0.002) (0.009) (0.036) (0.003) (0.004) 
College graduate 0.311** 0.366** 0.332** 0.246** 0.321** 
 
(0.002) (0.010) (0.037) (0.003) (0.006) 
Spouse Grade 12 0.214** 0.168** 0.238** 0.203** 0.143** 
 
(0.002) (0.010) (0.030) (0.002) (0.004) 
Spouse Some college 0.495** 0.532** 0.536** 0.479** 0.446** 
 
(0.002) (0.010) (0.030) (0.002) (0.004) 
Spouse College graduate 0.859** 0.886** 0.891** 0.847** 0.848** 
  (0.002) (0.010) (0.032) (0.003) (0.006) 
                Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. All models include eight region dummies, a metropolitan area dummy. 




2.4.3  Logistic Regression          
           I also use logistic regression to estimate the probability of labor force participation among 
single/married AI women, AN women, ON women and OI women. Labor force participation is 
used as the dependent variable. For each individual, labor force participation is either equal to 
one if working or looking for work or equal to zero otherwise. The explanatory variables for 
single women include the number of children in the household, the number of children under age 
5 in the household, if there are more than one adult with children in the household, educational 
attainments, birth place if born in Asia, years in the United States. For married women, besides 
that, the specification also controls for spouse’s education attainments and whether more than 
two adults with children in the household. 
2.4.4 Group Analysis 
          Besides regression analysis, group analysis also has been used to explore the difference 
within origin of country groups, married women with children under age 5 groups, educational 
attainment groups and age groups. The basic regression analysis may accurately reflect 
difference among four different groups of women in average behavior; however, it is possible 
that in the basic regression model some factors are not controlled for adequately. For this reason, 
I estimate the labor supply behavior by subgroups as well. It is very interesting to explore each 
group’s behaviors in greater depth. In the country origin analysis, AI women are sorted into 
different groups by their birth places to examine their labor supply behaviors. The results will be 





2.5 Regression Results 
         Table 2-7 and Table 2-8 show the analysis results of single women’s labor supply 
behaviors among all four subgroups of women.  
          Table 2-7 shows the results of OLS, 2SLS and labor force participation estimates which 
test the different labor supply behaviors among AI women, AN women, ON women and OI 
women (the omitted category). Column 1 reports OLS estimates; column 2 reports 2SLS 
estimates; and column 3 reports labor force participation estimates. For single women, 2SLS 
results show that their work hours are positively related with own wages but negatively related 
with the number of children in the household, which means that the more children under age 5 
the less annual work hours. However, it is surprising that with more than one adult in the 
household with children, single women will decrease their annual work hours by 74.117 
generally. So, another adult at home does not help single women’s labor supply at all. Single AI 
women work less than OI women, meanwhile, AN women work more than OI women and ON 
women as well. The results of labor force participation estimates represents roughly similar 





















 Number of own children in the household 6.599** -8.119** 0.068** 
 
(1.387) (1.521) (0.000) 
Number of own children under age 5 -132.269** -127.806** -0.284** 
 
(3.444) (3.788) (0.001) 
More than one adult in the household with 
children -68.471** -74.117** -0.156** 
 
(4.244) (4.666) (0.001) 
Years in the United States 6.734** 8.638** 0.018** 
 
(0.250) (0.275) (0.000) 
Born in Japan -103.509** -71.604* -0.388** 
 
(27.928) (30.724) (0.007) 
Born in Korea -186.231** -157.211** -0.552** 
 
(21.158) (23.277) (0.005) 
Born in Philippines 121.639** 164.833** 0.591** 
 
(18.818) (20.676) (0.005) 
Born in Vietnam 153.554** 146.878** 0.533** 
 
(19.979) (21.970) (0.005) 
Born in India -49.828* -8.887 -0.123** 
 
(22.966) (25.258) (0.006) 
AI women -110.534** -92.876** -0.435** 
 
(15.846) (17.420) (0.004) 
AN women 88.068** 184.116** 0.255** 
 
(9.856) (10.742) (0.003) 
ON women 61.095** 102.298** 0.138** 
  (5.418) (5.828) (0.001) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. All models include eight region dummies, a metropolitan area 
dummy, age and age squared, educational attainment dummies and census year dummies.  














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































          Table 2-8 shows single women OLS, 2SLS, and labor force participation estimates by four 
subgroups of women. In the each estimate, the first column reports the results of AI women; the 
second column reports these of AN women; the third column reports these of ON women; the 
last column reports these of OI women. In the column 5, 6, 7 and 8, it shows 2SLS estimations 
for four groups of women. In the 2SLS estimates, it shows that, holding others constant, single 
ON women are more likely to work more hours with higher wages than other group women. 
They are more responsive to the change in hourly wages. By controlling for birth places, 
including Japan, Korea, Philippines, Vietnam, India, other Asian countries (with China the 
omitted category), the results show that single AI women born in the different countries have 
different labor supply behaviors. Single AI women who were born in China and Philippines are 
more likely to work more hours than other AI women; however, those who were born in Japan 
and Korea work less hours than others. For single AI women, years in the United States are 
positively and significantly associated with women’s labor supply behavior. Single ON women 
with children in the household will increase work hours by 3.745 hours annually, but with 
children under age 5 in the household will decrease work hours by 135.318 hours annually. 
Interestingly, ON women have significantly negative relationships with the factors of having 
more than one adult in the household with children. One other adult in the household with 
children other than children’s mother does not increase single ON women’s labor supply or work 
hours, conversely, with one more adult in the household with children, single ON women will 
work fewer hours than usual. Furthermore, based on the results of labor force participation 
estimates, having one more adult in the household with children, both single AI women and OI 
women are more likely to work outside of home; however, both single AN and ON women work 
less. Years in the United States is a very important factor that affects AI women and OI women’s 
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labor supply behaviors. With one more year in the United States, AI women will work 0.036 
hours more annually, and OI women will work 0.007 hours more. 
          Table 2-10 to Table 2-13 represent the results of married women’s labor supply behaviors. 
These results allow me to examine different labor supply among the four groups of married 
women and show that married AN women work more hours than any other three groups of 
married women and they are more likely to work outside of home than the other groups. For 
married women, AI women and OI women do not work as much as ON women and AN women. 
These results differ from single AI women that married AI women work significantly more than 
OI women. Married women having children in the household will reduce their work hours 
sharply; moreover, if they have children under age 5 in the household annual work hours will be 
even lower.   
          To compare each labor supply behavior among four groups of married women, OLS, 2SLS 
and labor force participation estimates are applied for each group separately. Table 2-11 shows 
the results of 2SLS estimates with instrumental variables (IV) that are presented for the four 
groups of married women mentioned earlier. AN women and ON women are more responsive to 
both their own wages and spouse’s wages than other group women. For example, if AN women’ 
own hourly wages increase by one unit then they will work about 946.097 hours more annually 
and if their spouse’s hourly wages increase by one unit then they will work 724.412 hours less 
annually. However, AI’s annual work hours do not change as much as AN and ON’s with the 
increase in their own wages or their spouse’s wages. With one more unit increase in their own 
wages, AI will work 768.034 hours more annually; and with one more unit increase in their 
spouse’s wages, they will work 583.973 hours less annually. Moreover, married women with 
children in the household definitely will affect their labor supply negatively and with children 
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under age 5 in the household will have even more effect on their labor supply. But there seem to 
be no big differences for married AN women between the number of children in the household 
and the number of children under age 5 in the household. By controlling for the country of origin 
for AI,  the estimates show that married AI women who were born in Japan, Korea and India 
work less hours than those born in China, Philippines, and Vietnam. Moreover, the results show 
that the factor of having more than two adults in the household with children shows positive 
effects on AN women’s labor supply and negative effects on ON women. In other word, AN 
women’s higher work hours are also positively related to having more than two adults in the 
household with children. Holding other factors constant, having more than two adults in the 
household with children, AN women work 45.965 hours more annually, but ON work 13.164 
hours less. Thus, unlike married ON women, married AN women have the support of the extra 
adults at home and it is more possible for them to work more outside of home. 
          Labor force participation estimates in the column 9-12 show that women with children in 
the household are less likely to work; AI women, AN women and OI women are more likely to 
work outside with more than two adults in the household with children; ON women are less 
likely to work if they have other adults, except her and her spouse, in the household with 
children. 
          In this paper, Oaxaca decomposition approach is used to measure the unexplained gap in 
the means of the annual work hours between the two groups of women. As shown in the Table 
2-9, the results show that the effect of characteristics, sharing 89% of the gap in the means of the 
annual work hours, mostly account for the gap in labor force between ON and AI women. It 
indicated that the different characteristics between ON and AI women can explain most of the 
different labor supply behaviors between ON and AI women. And, 65% of the gap in labor force 
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between AI and AN women is contributed by the differences in coefficients, and 35% of the gap 
is due to the differences in covariates. It suggested that the different labor supply behaviors 
between AI and AN women are mostly associated with the characteristics. Meanwhile, only 36% 
of the gap in labor force between AN and ON women is caused by the differences in coefficients 
and 64% of the gap can be explained by the difference in covariates.  
Table 2-9 Oaxaca Decomposition Results. 
   
          In addition, I test married women labor supply behaviors by using subgroup analysis. First, 
I sort AI women into different groups by their birth places in the Table 2-12 and mainly focus on 
China, Japan, Korea, Philippines, Vietnam, and India, the top Asian immigrant countries. 
Coming from different countries, AI women have various responses to the change in hourly 
wages that women from China, Japan and India are much more responsive to the change in 
hourly wage than others. Also, women from Korea are more responsive to their spouse’s hourly 
wages than those from other Asian countries. With children in the household, women from Japan, 
Korea and India reduce their labor supply more than those from other Asian countries.  In these 
countries, women are less likely to work outside of the home, and these results support those 
cultural norms.   
          Secondly, Table 2-13 shows the results of elasticities for married women by subgroups 
including education groups, with children under 5 years’ old groups and age groups.  In the 
education groups, AI and AN women show very similar labor supply patterns. Both of them have 
higher own and cross wage elasticities in magnitude with some college education than with other 
 Covariates Effect Coefficient Effect 
AI and AN 35% 65% 
AI and ON 11% 89% 
AN and ON 64% 36% 
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education. With college graduates education, AN women’s own and cross wage elasticities are 
0.1 and -0.2. However, ON women have higher own wage elasticity (0.5) with grade 12 or less 
education than those with higher education. Also, it has been pointed out that the numbers of 
children in the household shifts women’s labor supply behavior. Specifically, in the Table 2-13, 
the own wage elasticities for mothers of young children are as high as 0.8 for AI women and 0.8 
for AN women; ON and OI women have even higher own wage elasticities than AI and AN 
women. Having children less than 5 years old in the household, AI women’s cross wage 
elasticity is -0.6, whose absolute value is the lowest one among the four subgroup women. 
Meanwhile, ON women have the highest cross wage elasticity (-0.8) in magnitude than other 
group women.  For age group, it is obvious that age 45-55 group’s own and cross wage 
elasticities are lower in magnitude than the younger age groups’. AI and AN women’s own and 
cross wage elasticities at the age 35-44 group are more elastic than those at the other age groups. 
ON and OI women at the age 25-34 groups have the highest own wage elasticities among their 
own age groups. These elasticities results show that AI and AN women have very similar labor 
supply behavior by the subgroups of education, mothers with younger children and age. The 
results are consistent with theory, indicating that compensated wage elasticities are positive and 
income effects are negative. 
          Women’s labor supply has been more sensitive to their own wages than men’s labor 
supply. Blau and Kahn (2007) stated the changes in female labor force participation from 1980 to 
2000 and found that there was a dramatic reduction in women’s own wage elasticity and their 
cross wage elasticity fell by 38 to 47 percent in absolute value. Heim (2007) presented that 
married women’s hours wage elasticities have decreased substantially from 0.36 to 0.14 over the 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































          This paper has examined differences in women’s labor supply across Asian immigrant, 
native, and other immigrant and native groups.  The results show that labor supply behaviors 
differ significantly across the groups.   
          Obviously, family membership and its obligations have important effects on married 
women’s labor supply. The results show that there are significant and different effects of control 
variables on women’s labor supply among AI women, AN women, ON women and OI women. 
The fertility effects are very strong. All women will decrease their work hours with one or more 
children in the household and ON women having children under age 5 in the household usually 
decrease more work hours than AN women and Asian first-generation women. More importantly, 
I find that in households with children, having more than two adults rather than themselves or 
their spouses, AI women and AN women spend much more time in market work than ON 
women. This means that more than two adults in the household with children are positively and 
significantly associated with married AI women and AN women’s labor supply behaviors.  Extra 
adults in the household share in the division of labor in the family so that AI women and AN 
women can focus on the work out of home rather than unpaid housework. In this paper, since I 
do not control for earnings of other adults in the household, women’s labor supply behaviors 
may be explained by other earnings by household members who are not the spouse. 
          Additionally, married AI women have significantly different labor supply behavior from 
married ON women and AN women. Unlike ON and AN women, AI women have lower 
employment rates even though they have lower divorce rate but higher education attainment. 
Usually, they are less responsive to hourly wage and spouse’s hourly wages than AN women and 
ON women. In other words, their own wages and spouse wages do not affect their labor supply 
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behaviors as much as AN women’s and ON women’s. Moreover, their country of origin has a 
differential effect on their labor supply behaviors. Japan, Korea, and India’s women’s labor 
supply indicates that married women from male-dominated society work fewer hours than other 
Asian immigrant women, because in the male-dominated society, women conform to gendered 
care-taking roles. 
2.7 Data Appendix 
          Data were obtained from 2006 – 2011 American Community Survey (ACS) one-year 
estimates. All nominal earnings and income variables were converted into 1999 dollars using the 
Personal Consumption Expenditures price index from the National Income and Product Market 
Accounts (see http://www.bea.gov). All top-coded value of total wage and salary earnings were 
multiplied by correction factor 1.45 used by Blau and Kahn (2007).  
          Hourly wage observations are considered as invalid if they are less than $2 or greater than 
$200 per hour in 1999 dollars. For non-workers, the self-employed and those with invalid wage 
observations, wages are imputed using a regression approach that proposed by Juhn(1992), Juhn 
and Murphy (1997) and Balu and Kahn (2007). Non-workers receive predicted wages based on 
the regression using the working 1-13 weeks per year sample. The other categories of worker, 
including the self-employed and these with invalid wage observations, were imputed hourly 
wages using the regression corresponding to the weeks they worked. The separate log wage 
regression is run for single women and married women by weeks worked cells. The regressors 
used were own and spouse (if married) variables for age, age squared, three education categories, 
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          As everyone who has a child quickly discovers, children are an extremely expensive 
commodity during one’s lifetime. The investment in children, such as time, money and effort, is 
unlimited and continuous. Particularly, time investment is thought to be very important to 
children’s development.   
          Becker (1965) presented a theory of the allocation of time by adding time use in the 
production of household utility. In Becker’s model there are two constraints: the budget 
constraint for goods and another one for time. The rational individual maximizes her utility 
subject to a time constraint and a budget constraint by choosing the optimal prices of goods and 
amount of time to spend in each activity during a day. Becker (1991), in “A Treatise on the 
Family”, stated that the time parents spend with their children and other financial and material 
resources can be seen as investments into the production of child quality. Moreover, he presented 
specialization in a multi-person households and concluded that “if all members of an efficient 
household have different comparative advantages, no more than one member would allocate time 
to both the market and household sectors.”  
          In “The Socioeconomic Attainments of Asian Americans”, Sakamoto, Goyette and Kim 
(2004) concluded that Asian Americans have higher mean values on most indicators of 
socioeconomic status than non-Hispanic whites, such as educational achievements and labor 
market. Moreover, the determinants of the higher education participation and success have been 
discussed by several scholars and researchers. By using diaries from the Longitudinal Study of 
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Australian Children, Fiorini and Keane (2012) pointed out that time spent in educational 
activities, particularly with parents, is the most productive inputs for cognitive skill development. 
Chiswick and DebBurman (2003) concluded that second-generation immigrant American adults 
have the highest level of schooling, exceeding that of the foreign born and of the native born 
with native-born parents. It has been shown that the time allocation of women with children 
affects children’s educational attainments. The allocation of time with children plays an 
important role in the development of human capital and the subsequent socioeconomic status that 
will be transmitted from generation to generation. Thus, this paper will examine the different 
time allocations between immigrant and native women with their children and explore the 
difference on various kinds of child care, including total child care, educational child care, 
recreational child care and travel child care.  
  As more and more women work outside the home, it is very natural that the question of 
the different time spent with children by working and non-working women is examined by 
researchers. For a typical weekday, a working woman with children may spend time on working, 
sleeping, doing housework, leisure, and child care and so on; a non-working woman with 
children may involve all the same activities except market work.  
           Researchers predict that at the current pace, by the year 2040 one in three children will 
grow up in a household with at least one foreign-born parent (Suarez-Orozco et al., 2008). I 
focus on all immigrant women in this research. Firstly, this paper will examine immigrant 
parents’ time allocated to the care of their children by subgroups (working/non-working, years of 
schooling), compared with native women. Also, I focus on the different time allocation with 
children between immigrant working mothers and non-working mothers. Finally, this paper will 
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explore the different time allocation between immigrant and native women among all time use 
categories.  
3.2 Literature 
          There are many articles trying to examine the allocation of time with children by different 
groups. In general, a parent’s level of education affects how much time he or she will spend with 
their children. Using data from American Time Use Surveys 2003-2006, Guryan, Hurst and 
Kearney (2008) concluded that higher-educated parents spent more time with their children, and 
also spent more time working outside the home than lower-educated parents. Early time diary 
studies showed that more highly educated mothers not only spent more time on average with 
children, but they also tended to do more intellectually stimulating things with their children 
(Leibowitz, 1977; Hill & Stafford, 1974). For the different birth order, Price (2006) concluded 
that a first-born children received 20-30 more minutes of quality time each day with his or her 
parent than a second-born child of the same age from a similar family.            
           Time use data from European countries showed similar patterns of increases in parental 
time in primary child care across a number of developed countries (Gauthier, Smeeding, and 
Furstenberg, 2004). The authors documented a notable increase in time spent in child care for all 
subsamples considered: working/nonworking mothers, working/nonworking father. 
          In terms of working and non-working women, even though many researchers have shown 
that employed parents spent less time with their children than non-employed parents, when 
researchers compared working parents with non-working parents who have school-aged children 
(not present in the home often), the results indicated that non-working parent did not spend 
significantly more time with their children than working parents (Bianchi, 2000; Zick and Bryant, 
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1996; Gauthier, Smeeding, and Furstenberg, 2004; Sayer, Bianchi, and Robison, 2004). Stewart 
(2010) focused on pre-school-aged children. By using a two stages timing model, he figured out 
that both full-time and part-time employed mothers shifted enriching childcare time from 
workdays to non-workdays. On workdays, full-time employed mothers shifted enriching 
childcare time to evenings, but part-time employed mothers shifted childcare time very little. 
          Moreover, the allocation of time has changed. Aguiar and Hurst (2007) found that both 
women and men had a dramatic increase in leisure time lies behind the relatively stable number 
of market hours worked between 1965 and 2003. This was driven by a decline in home 
production work hours. From 1993 to 2003, the increase in childcare was over five hours per 
week, conditional on having a child in the household. It is interesting that as mothers increased 
market work they reduced their time in housework but not childcare (Bianchi, Robinson, and 
Milkie, 2006). 
         Even though there is some research on women’s time allocation with their children, very 
few papers focus on immigrant women’s time allocation with their children. In this research, I 
will examine immigrant women’s time allocation with their children and their daily time use. In 
the next section, I will describe data and method that are used to compare immigrant and native 
women’s time allocation with their children. Then, I will present the results and conclusions. 
3.3 Data and Method 
          The 2005-2011 American Time Use Surveys (ATUS) is used for the analysis. The 
American Time Use Surveys (ATUS), which is reported by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
is a continuous survey about how individuals age 15 and over spend their time doing various 
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activities, such as work, childcare, housework, watching television, volunteering, and socializing. 
ATUS data files can be linked to data files from the Current Population Survey (CPS), so it 
offers us more information about each individual.  
          The primary analysis sample includes only those women between the ages of 21 and 55 
with at least one child under age 18 and only those who had a completed 24-hour time diary. 
Since this paper focuses on all immigrant women and compares the different time allocation 
between immigrant and native women with their children, the sample only includes immigrant 
and native women. Immigrant women are the women who were not born in the United States, 
but are living in the United States now; native women refer to the women who were born in the 
United States. In the sample, there are totally 16,251 women with children, including 13,429 
native women and 2,822 immigrant women. Also, there are 9,557 working native women and 
1,576 working immigrant women; 3,872 non-working native women and 1,246 non-working 
immigrant women in the sample. 
           To analyze immigrant women’s time allocation with their children, this paper defines 
“total child care” as the sum of four primary time use components. It includes “Basic child care”, 
“Educational child care”, “Recreational child care”, and “Travel child care”. “Basic child care” is 
time spent on the basic needs of children, including breast-feeding, rocking a child to sleep, 
feeding, changing diapers, providing medical care to child, grooming child, and so on. However, 
time spent preparing a child’s food/meal is included in general “food preparation”, a component 
of core nonmarket work. “Educational child care” is time spent reading to children, teaching 
children, helping children with homework, attending meetings at a child’s school, and so on. 
“Recreational child care” involves playing games with children, playing outdoors with children, 
attending a child’s sporting event or dance recital, going to the zoo with children, taking walks 
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with children. “Travel child care” is time spent on any travel related to any of the three other 
categories of child care, such as driving a child to school, to a doctor, and to dance practice. 
“Total child care” is the sum of all these four subcategories. 
          This paper also tests the different time allocations of immigrant and native women in 
general. It defines “Total child care”, “Total market work”, “Total nonmarket work”, “Leisure” 
and “Other”.  Again, “Total child care” is the sum of all these four subcategories. “Total market 
work” includes core market work (such as work for paid main job and other job), plus other work 
related activities, searching for a job and applying for unemployment benefits and so on. “Total 
nonmarket work” contains core nonmarket work (such as food preparation, food presentation, 
kitchen/food cleanup, washing/drying cloths, ironing, dusting, vacuuming, indoor cleaning, 
indoor painting), plus shopping/obtaining goods and services (including grocery shopping, 
shopping for other goods, comparison shopping, clipping coupons, going to bank, going to post 
office, meeting with lawyer, going to veterinarian and so on) and other home production (such as 
vehicle repair, outdoor repair, outdoor painting, yard work, pet care, and gardening). But this 
category excludes any time spent acquiring medical care. For “Leisure” measures, Leisure 
Measure 2 is used in this paper, which is defined by Aguiar and Hurst (Aguiar and Hurst, 2007). 
It sums together all time spent on entertainment/social activities/relaxing and active recreation 
described in Appendix Table 2-5, as well as time spent sleeping, eating, and on personal care. 
Medical care is excluded in this category. Finally, the rest of activities are sorted into “Others” 
measures. Appendix Table 2-5 shows more details related to each subcategory. 
           In this paper, the dependent variable is the total women’s time spent with their children. 
Because I examine women’s time allocation with their children on basic child care, educational 
child care, recreational child care and travel child care as well, other dependent variables are 
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defined accordingly. For example, mothers spend time with children on physical care, education-
related activities, reading, talking, playing/doing hobbies, looking after children, attending 
children’s events, travel and other childcare activities daily. Also, some independent variables 
are applied to test women’s time allocation with children. For example, one of the main 
independent variables is the mother’s educational attainment, which has four categories: less 
than high school, high school, some college, and college degree or more. The independent 
variables also include hourly wages (if working), mother’s age, number of child in the household, 
years in the United States (for immigrants) and dummy variables such as whether mother is a 
native woman or an immigrant woman.  
          Because this paper is trying to examine the mother’s time spent with children and compare 
the difference between immigrant and native women within different subcategories, there is 
more than one dependent variable to be analyzed simultaneously. So, multivariate analysis is 
used in this paper, and the following equation will be estimated: 
                 Ti = α + β * Xi + γ * Zi + δ * Di + εi                                                                 (3.1) 
           Where Ti, the dependent variable, is the mother i’s time spent with her children by hours 
for different specific activities including total child care, basic child care, educational child care, 
recreational child care and travel child care. Xi represents the dummy variable indicating the 
mother i’s educational attainment. Zi represents other independent variables, such as hourly 
wages (if working), mother i’s age, mother i’s age squared, mother i’s age cube, the number of 
children in the mother i’s household, if the youngest children is under age 5, mother i’s marital 
status, mother i’s races, years in the United States, the day of week dummies, the month of year 
dummies and survey year dummies. Di is a dummy variable indicating whether mother is an 
immigrant or native woman. εi is the error term of this equation. 
52 
 
          Using the specification (3.1), I can figure out the mother’s time spent with their children 
on each specific activity by controlling for the different educational attainment. Also, it tests 
immigrant and native women’s different time allocation with their children by controlling for the 
immigrant women dummy variable. Furthermore, I separate mothers into two groups by their 
working status, either working or not working. In this way, the results will show me the 
differences in time spent on childcare between working mothers and non-working mothers. The 
women with employed status will be considered as working women; those with unemployed or 
not in labor force status will be considered as non-working women. Although some non-working 
women may get some hours on total market work category, because their activities, such as 
searching for a job and applying for unemployment benefits,  are sorted into total market work 
category, those women are considered as non-working women. 
         Additionally, the specification (3.1) is used to explore working and non-working women’s 
time use categories, including total market work, total nonmarket work, total childcare, total 
leisure and others. Similar to the previous estimation, multivariate analysis is used to test the 
different time use in each category between native women and immigrant women. 
          The results will help us understand the differences between native and immigrant women 
in the allocation of time to care their children. Moreover, I expect that working mothers with the 
limited and less time will spend their time on different activities from non-working mothers.  
3.4 Results 
          To compare women’s hours spent in childcare between various subgroups, the data is 
separated into different groups including immigrant/native, working/non-working and marital 
status. Table 3-1 shows the percentage of the women’s time allocation with their child through 
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basic child care, educational child care, recreational child care and travel child care. In general, 
native women spent slightly more time with their children in total and it is true for both working 
and non-working. However, on average, working immigrant women spend 1.44 hours, about 15 
percent of total childcare, on educational childcare, which is 0.24 hours more than working 
native women. On average, married working native women spend 1.24 hours per week on 
educational child care and married working immigrant women spend 1.54 hours per week on 
educational child care. Both married non-working native and immigrant women spend more time 
on educational child care than the related working women. In terms of each subgroup, native 
women spend more time on recreational child care on average than immigrant women by number 
and percentage, but spend less time on travel child care than immigrant women on average. 
Source: 2006-2011 American Time Use Surveys. Samples include all individuals between the ages of 21 and 55who 
had time diaries summing to a complete day and at least one child under the age of 18. 
Figure 3-1 Women’s Hours Spent in Childcare by Various Subgroups. 
          Parents with different education levels spent substantially different amount of time in child 
care. Figure 3-2 reports that both immigrant and native women with less education level spend 
less time on total child care. With higher education level, immigrant women increase time spent 



















on educational child care to 2.06 hours per week on average and native women show an increase 
to 1.92 hours per week as well. Time spent on recreational child care does not show a dramatic 
increase for both groups of women. Even though the percentage does not show a continuous 
increase as education levels go higher, the amount of time spent on educational childcare 
increases with higher education levels of mothers. In sum, the allocation of time on educational 
childcare is driven by mothers’ educational levels. 
Source: 2006-2011 American Time Use Surveys. Samples include all individuals between the ages of 21 and 55 who had time 
diaries summing to a complete day and at least one child under the age of 18. 
Figure 3-2 Women’s Hours Spent in Childcare by Educational Attainment. 
          Figure 3-3 shows the different women’s time spent on childcare by marital status. It is 
obvious that married women with spouse present in the household spend significantly more 
hours with their children in various childcare categories than women who are never married, 
widowed, divorced and separated. They spent more time on basic child care, and educational 
child care than other groups of women. Never married women with children in the household 
spent slightly less hours on total child care than married women with spouse present in the 

















household but more hours on total child care than other groups of women. Widowed, divorced 
and separated women spend less time with their children. 
 
Source: 2006-2011 American Time Use Surveys. Samples include all individuals between the ages of 21 and 55 who had time 
diaries summing to a complete day and at least one child under the age of 18. 
Figure 3-3 Women’s Hours Spent in Childcare by Marital Status. 
          In term of working and non-working women’s time allocation with their children, the 
results are very interesting. Table 3-1 and Table 3-2 present the multivariate OLS regressions 
results of non-working women’s time allocation with their children and working women’s time 
allocation with their children separately. In Table 3-1, it shows that married non-working women 
spent more hours on total child care, basic child care and educational child care than other non-
working women. Holding all else constant, with one more child under age 18 in the household, 
non-working women will spend 0.616 hours
12
 more on educational child care per week, 0.805 
hours more on basic child care per week, and 0.498 hours more on travel child care per week,  
but 0.379 hours less on recreational child care per week. More importantly, the results show that 
non-working immigrant women do spend more hours on total child care and basic child care than 
                                                 
12
 The surveys are reported in units of “minutes per day”. I converted the minute-per-day reports to “hours per 
week” by multiplying 7/60. 
 

















non-working native women, however, the more years they are in the United States, the fewer 
hours they will spend on basic child care and educational child care. Working women’s time 
allocation with children is slightly different from non-working women shown in Table 3-2. 
Obviously, working women’s time allocation with their children is negatively affected by their 
hourly wages. The higher hourly wages, the less hours they spent on child care. Similar to non-
working women, with one more child under age 18 in the household, working women will spend 
0.264 hours more on educational child care. Different from non-working women, working 
immigrant women spend 0.495 hours more on educational child care than working native women. 
There is no evidence that years in the United States will affect working immigrant women’s time 
allocation with their children. For both working and non-working women, the results document 
that women’s education level affects their time allocation with children positively, especially 
educational child care.   
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Married 2.400** 1.214** 0.539** 0.404 0.241 
 
(0.554) (0.354) (0.175) (0.340) (0.167) 
The youngest child is under age 5 9.063** 4.848** -0.746** 4.952** 0.008 
 
(0.533) (0.341) (0.168) (0.328) (0.160) 
Number of household children < 
18 1.540** 0.805** 0.616** -0.379** 0.498** 
 
(0.199) (0.127) (0.063) (0.122) (0.060) 
Race: (White omitted)      
Black, non-Hispanic only -4.241** -0.756 -0.095 -3.122** -0.267 
 
(0.727) (0.465) (0.230) (0.447) (0.219) 
Asian, non-Hispanic only -0.492 0.539 -0.222 -1.451 0.642 
 
(3.605) (2.307) (1.140) (2.217) (1.087) 
American Indian, native 
Hawaiian and multiple races 
-1.135 -0.474 -0.623 0.157 -0.194 
(1.487) (0.951) (0.470) (0.914) (0.448) 
Hispanic -3.172** -0.179 -0.153 -2.901** 0.062 
 
(0.817) (0.523) (0.258) (0.502) (0.246) 
Asian immigrants -1.410 -0.431 0.930 -0.908 -1.001 
 
(3.868) (2.475) (1.223) (2.378) (1.166) 
Hispanic immigrants -3.277* -1.803* -0.256 -1.422 0.204 
 
(1.346) (0.861) (0.425) (0.827) (0.405) 
Immigrants to U.S. 5.484** 2.164* 0.810 1.665 0.843 
 
(1.560) (0.998) (0.493) (0.959) (0.470) 
Immigrant's year of entry into the 
U.S. -0.220** -0.128* -0.061* -0.001 -0.028 
 
(0.081) (0.052) (0.025) (0.050) (0.024) 
Education Attainment: (less than 12 years of schooling omitted) 
A high school diploma or GED 
equivalent 
0.608 0.524 0.225 -0.336 0.195 
(0.644) (0.412) (0.204) (0.396) (0.194) 
Some college 0.855 0.479 0.538* -0.342 0.180 
 
(0.696) (0.445) (0.220) (0.428) (0.209) 
A college degree 5.847** 2.185** 0.559* 1.995** 1.106** 
 
(0.771) (0.493) (0.244) (0.474) (0.232) 
Graduate education 5.337** 1.802** 1.595** 1.204 0.735* 
  (1.053) (0.674) (0.333) (0.647) (0.317) 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. All time use measures are expressed in units of “hours per week.” All models include 
age, age squared and age cube, the day of week dummies, the month of year dummies, and survey year dummies.  All regression 
coefficients are calculated using fixed demographic weights adjust to equally represent each day of the week within subgroups. 





















Log hourly wages -0.693** -0.389** -0.098** -0.178** -0.027 
 
(0.108) (0.065) (0.028) (0.061) (0.035) 
Married -0.012 0.498** -0.041 -0.091 -0.377** 
 
(0.293) (0.176) (0.077) (0.167 (0.095) 
The youngest child is under 
age 5 6.547** 3.213** -0.118 2.710** 0.741* 
 
(0.306) (0.183) (0.080) (0.174) (0.099) 
Number of household 
children < 18 1.284* 0.795** 0.264** -0.059 0.283** 
 
(0.140) (0.084) (0.037) (0.080) (0.045) 
Race: (White omitted)      
Black, non-Hispanic only -2.293** -0.473* -0.080 -1.637** -0.102 
 
(0.377) (0.226) (0.099) (0.215) (0.122) 
Asian, non-Hispanic only 0.273 0.600 0.614 -0.807 -0.134 
 
(1.271) (0.763) (0.334) (0.725) (0.412) 
American Indian, native 
Hawaiian and multiple races 
-1.570 -0.714 -0.096 -0.446 -0.312 
(0.947) (0.568) (0.249) (0.540) (0.307) 
Hispanic -1.502** -0.746** -0.082* -1.218 0.544** 
 
(0.482) (0.289) (0.127) (0.275) (0.156) 
Asian immigrants -2.264 -1.389 -0.420 -0.523 0.069 
 
(1.526) (0.916) (0.401) (0.870) (0.495) 
Hispanic immigrants -2.075 -1.090 -0.459* -0.266 -0.258 
 
(0.868) (0.521) (0.228) (0.495) (0.281) 
Immigrants to U.S. 1.152* 0.949* 0.495* -0.496 0.204 
 
(0.937) (0.562) (0.246) (0.534) (0.304) 
Immigrant's year of entry 
into the U.S. -0.037 -0.053 0.006 0.025 -0.016 
 
(0.055) (0.033) (0.014) (0.031) (0.017) 
Education Attainment: (less than 12 years of schooling omitted) 
A high school diploma or 
GED equivalent 
0.877 0.719* 0.127 -0.026 0.056 
(0.547) (0.326) (0.143) (0.310) (0.176) 
Some college 2.038** 1.170** 0.220 0.242 0.405* 
 
(0.545) (0.327) (0.143) (0.310) (0.176) 
A college degree 4.259** 1.981** 0.443** 1.158** 0.675** 
 
(0.571) (0.342) (0.150) (0.325) (0.185) 
Graduate education 5.999** 2.888** 0.560** 1.645** 0.904** 
  (0.633) (0.380) (0.166) (0.361) (0.205) 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. All time use measures are expressed in units of “hours per week.” All models include 
age, age squared and age cube, the day of week dummies, the month of year dummies, and survey year dummies.  All regression 
coefficients are calculated using fixed demographic weights adjust to equally represent each day of the week within subgroups. 
 * Denotes significance at 5%. ** Denotes significance at 1%.
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          In this paper, Oaxaca decomposition approach is used to measure the unexplained gap in 
the means of the women’s time allocation between immigrant women and native women. For 
married non-working women, 61% of the gap in total child care between immigrant women and 
native women is explained by the differences in covariates and the other 39% is due to the 
differences in coefficients; also, 59% of gap in educational child care between immigrant women 
and native women is contributed by the difference in covariates and the other 41% is due to the 
differences in coefficients. For married working women, 54% of covariates effect and 46% of 
coefficient effect together account for the gap in total child care between immigrant women and 
native women; meanwhile, the differences in covariates explain almost 96% of the gap in 
educational child care between immigrant women and native women. 
          Moreover, from Table 3-1 and Table 3-2, the results show that, for both working and non-
working women, education attainments have an important effect on their time allocation with 
children. The women with college degree or graduate education are more likely to spend more 
time on total child care than the ones with only less than 12 years of schooling. In order to test 
the women’s time allocation by different education attainments, we separate women into two 
education attainment groups: lower education and higher education. In the lower education group, 
including women who have high school diploma or GED equivalent education level or less than 
12 years of schooling. In the higher education group, it includes all of the women who have 
some college, or a college degree, or graduate education. Table 3-3 shows the multivariate OLS 
regressions of non-working women’s time allocation with children by both lower and higher 
education. In general, the results show that non-working women with children under age 5 will 
spend more time on total child care, basic child care and recreational child care but less time on 
educational child care. It also shows that higher educated women spend more hours on total child 
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care, basic child care and recreational child care then lower educated women if their youngest 
child is under age 5. With one more child under age 18 in the household, lower educated women 
only increase 0.248 hours per week on educational child care; however, under the same situation, 
higher educated women will increase about 1.015 hours per week on educational child care. The 
results show that lower educated immigrant women will spend 1.400 hours more on educational 
child care than lower educated native women. For non-working women, higher educated women 
show significantly different time allocation with their children from lower educated women. 
Table 3-4 shows the multivariate OLS regressions of working women’s time allocation with 
children by both lower and higher education. If there is one more unit increase in log hourly 
wage, lower educated women will decrease 0.566 hours per week spent on total child care; 
compared with 0.467 hours decrease of higher educated women. The change in hourly wage does 
not affect higher educated women’s time allocation with children as much as lower educated 
women’s. For working women, with the youngest child under age 5, higher educated women will 
spend more hours on total child care than lower educated women. Moreover, with one more 
child under age 18 in the household, higher educated women will spend 0.267 hours more on 
educational child care, and lower educated women only spend 0.195 hours more on educational 
child care. Educational child care is affected by women’s educational level whether they are 
immigrants or natives. Obviously, lower educated immigrant women spend more time on 
educational child care than lower educated native women. But, for working women, the results 
do not show any significant difference in time allocations on educational child care between 
higher educated immigrant women and native women. 
          Figure 3-4 and Figure 3-5 how women’s hours spent in different time use categories by 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































total nonmarket work time, total leisure time and others. Over all, Figure 3-4 shows that native 
women spend slightly more time on total childcare than immigrant women for each subgroup. 
Working immigrant women spend more time on total market work and total nonmarket work 
than working native women; however, they spend less time on leisure than working native 
women. On average, married working native women spend 32.56 hours per week on total market 
work, 21.28 hours per week on total nonmarket work and 95.65 hours per week on leisure; 
meanwhile, married working immigrant women spend 34.84 hours per week on total market 
work, 23.49 hours per week on total nonmarket work and only 93.14 hours per week on leisure. 
In Figure 3-5, it shows the different time use categories by races. Non-working Asian women 
spend more time on total childcare than any other race and black women spend less time on total 
childcare than other races. Asian working women spend more hours on total childcare than other 
races as well, and they also spend more time on total market work than any other races. Since 
they spend much time on childcare and market work and nonmarket work, it is not surprising to 
see that Asian women spend only 91.56 hours per week on leisure, which is about 4 to 9 hours 




Source: 2006-2011 American Time Use Surveys. Notice that non-working women, who are unemployed or not in labor force, 
may have a small amount of total market work time because total market work time includes time spent searching a job, applying 
the unemployment benefits and so on. 
Figure 3-4 Women’s Hours Spent in Different Time Use Categories by Various Subgroups. 
Source: 2006-2011 American Time Use Surveys. Notice that non-working women, who are unemployed or not in labor force, 
may have a small amount of total market work time because total market work time includes time spent searching a job, applying 
the unemployment benefits and so on. 
 
Figure 3-5 Women’s Hours Spent in Different Time Use Categories by Races. 
 
 






































          Furthermore, the multivariate OLS regressions show more interesting results for non-
working women and working women’s time use categories. There are five categories including 
total childcare time, total market work time, total nonmarket work time, total leisure time and 
other time. Firstly, in Table 3-5, the results show that non-working women’s time use is affected 
by marriage. If non-working women are married, their total childcare time will increase 2.4 
hours per week, total nonmarket work time will increase 4.192 hours per week and total leisure 
time will decrease 4.859 hours per week. It makes sense that a non-working mother spends more 
time with children and finishes most of housework daily but has less time to spend on leisure 
because of specialization in the household. Non-working immigrant women spend more time 
with their children but less time on leisure. With one more year in the United States they will 
spend 0.22 hours less per week on childcare.  Table 3-6 shows the results of working women’s 
time use by each subcategory. Working women’s time use is closely associated with their hourly 
wage. Holding all else constant, given a one percent increase in hourly wages, working women 
will spend more hours on market work but less hours on childcare, nonmarket work and leisure. 
If working women’s youngest children are under age 5, they will spend 6.547 hours more on 
childcare, 2.034 hours less on market work and  2.255 hours more on nonmarket work. Working 
immigrant women spend 5.392 hours more on market work and 5.373 hours less on leisure. Also, 






















Married 2.400* -1.673** 4.192** -4.859** -0.059 
 
(0.554) (0.603) (0.683) (0.868) (0.586) 
the youngest child is under 5 9.063** -0.683 -0.745 -5.518** -2.116** 
 
(0.533) (0.581) (0.658) (0.836) (0.565) 
Number of household children 
< 18 1.540** -0.525* 1.160** -2.897** 0.722** 
 
(0.199) (0.217) (0.246) (0.312) (0.211) 
Race: (White omitted)      
Black, non-Hispanic only -4.241** 3.626** -5.919** 4.912** 1.622* 
 
(0.727) (0.792) (0.897) (1.139) (0.770) 
Asian, non-Hispanic only -0.492 -2.658 -6.291 10.858 -1.415 
 
(3.605) (3.928) (4.447) (5.649) (3.819) 
American Indian, native 
Hawaiian and multiple races 
-1.135 -0.269 0.389 -4.423 5.438** 
(1.487) (1.620) (1.834) (2.330) (1.575) 
Hispanic -3.172** 1.320 -1.094 1.593 1.354 
 
(0.817) (0.890) (1.008) (1.280) (0.865) 
Asian immigrants -1.410 3.010 5.854 -8.563 1.109 
 
(3.868) (4.215) (4.771) (6.061) (4.097) 
Hispanic immigrants -3.277* 0.734 2.508 2.493 -2.459 
 
(1.346) (1.467) (1.660) (2.109) (1.426) 
Immigrants to U.S. 5.484** -0.641 2.241 -7.245** 0.161 
 
(1.560) (1.700) (1.924) (2.445) (1.652) 
Immigrant's year of entry into 
the U.S. 
-0.220** -0.087 0.067 0.207 0.032 
(0.081) (0.089) (0.101) (0.128) (0.086) 
Education Attainment: (less than 12 years of schooling omitted) 
A high school diploma or GED 
equivalent 
0.608 -0.838 0.291 -1.432 1.371* 
(0.644) (0.702) (0.795) (1.010) (0.683) 
Some college 0.855 0.882 -0.229 -4.671** 3.163** 
 
(0.696) (0.758) (0.858) (1.090) (0.737) 
A college degree 5.847** 0.656 -2.021* -7.028** 2.545** 
 
(0.771) (0.840) (0.951) (1.209) (0.817) 
Graduate education 5.337** 1.306 -2.175 -7.086** 2.617* 
  (1.053) (1.148) (1.299) (1.651) (1.116) 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. All time use measures are expressed in units of “hours per week.” All models include 
age, age squared and age cube, the day of week dummies, the month of year dummies, and survey year dummies.  All regression 
coefficients are calculated using fixed demographic weights adjust to equally represent each day of the week within subgroups. 
Notice that non-working women, who are unemployed or not in labor force, may have a small amount of total market work time 
because total market work time includes time spent searching a job, applying the unemployment benefits and so on. 



















Log hourly wages -0.693** 3.297** -1.117** -0.774** -0.711** 
 
(0.108) (0.249) (0.159) (0.203) (0.113) 
Married -0.012 -2.034* 2.255** -0.722 0.512 
 
(0.293) (0.672) (0.430) (0.549) (0.3053 
The youngest child is under age 
5 6.547** -2.343** -0.889* -2.666** -0.647* 
 
(0.306) (0.701) (0.449) (0.573) (0.318) 
Number of household children 
< 18 1.284** -0.222 0.580** -1.997** 0.354 
 
(0.140) (0.322) (0.206) (0.263) (0.146) 
Race: (White omitted)      
Black, non-Hispanic only -2.293** 2.601** -3.822** 1.179 2.334** 
 
(0.377) (0.865) (0.554) (0.706) (0.393) 
Asian, non-Hispanic only 0.273 4.091 3.031 -5.019* -2.37 
 
(1.271) (2.913) (1.865) (2.379) (1.322) 
American Indian, native 
Hawaiian and multiple races 
-1.570 -1.141 1.900 0.314 0.497 
(0.947) (2.170) (1.389) (1.772) (0.985) 
Hispanic -1.502** 2.293** -0.810 -0.714 0.734 
 
(0.482) (1.106) (0.708) (0.903) (0.502) 
Asian immigrants -2.264 -3.878 -2.058 7.081* 1.120 
 
(1.526) (3.497) (2.238) (2.856) (1.587) 
Hispanic immigrants -2.075** -2.520 3.110* 2.049 -0.564 
 
(0.868) (1.990) (1.273) (1.625) (0.903) 
Immigrants to U.S. 1.152 5.392* -0.207 -5.373** -0.962 
 
(0.937) (2.148) (1.375) (1.754) (0.975) 
Immigrant's year of entry into 
the U.S. 
-0.037 -0.208 0.028 0.153 0.063 
(0.055) (0.126) (0.081) (0.103) (0.057) 
Education Attainment: (less than 12 years of schooling omitted) 
A high school diploma or GED 
equivalent 
0.877 -0.323 -0.001 -0.713 0.162 
(0.544) (1.248) (0.798) (1.019) (0.566) 
Some college 2.038 -1.496 0.007 -1.908 1.358* 
 
(0.545) (1.249) (0.799) (1.020) (0.567) 
A college degree 4.259 -1.839 -0.034 -3.673** 1.288* 
 
(0.571) (1.308) (0.837) (1.068) (0.594) 
Graduate education 5.999 -2.066 0.244 -4.874** 0.696 
  (0.633) (1.452) (0.929) (1.185) (0.659) 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. All time use measures are expressed in units of “hours per week.” All models include 
age, age squared and age cube, the day of week dummies, the month of year dummies, and survey year dummies.  All regression 
coefficients are calculated using fixed demographic weights adjust to equally represent each day of the week within subgroups. 
         *  Denotes significance at 5%. **  Denotes significance at 1%. 
          Similarly to Table 3-3 and Table 3-4, Table 3-7 and Table 3-8 report the multivariate OLS 
regressions of non-working and working women’s time use categories by both lower and higher 
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education, respectively. In Table 3-7, for non-working women, the results show that married 
lower educated women will spend 2.419 hours more on total childcare than non-married lower 
educated women, and 4.482 hours more on total nonmarket work. In contrast, married higher 
educated women will spend 3.811 hours more on total childcare than non-married higher 
educated women, and only 2.853 hours more on total nonmarket work. Marital status affects 
women’s time use. More interesting, immigrant women with lower education will spend 15.330 
hours less on total leisure time than native women with lower education. Table 3-8 shows the 
working women’s time use categories. For working women, hourly wages have more of an effect 
on lower educated women’s total childcare time than higher educated women’s. With a one 
percent increase in hourly wages, lower educated women will spend 0.566 hours less on total 
childcare, and higher educated women will spend 0.467 hours less on total childcare. For 
working women, marriage is an important indicator as well. Married lower educated women will 
spend 3.098 hour more on total nonmarket work than non-married lower educated women; 
however, married higher educated women will only spend 1.662 hours more on total nonmarket 
work than non-married higher educated women. Thus, lower educated women are more likely to 
spend more hours on total nonmarket work once they married.  It is also true that with the 
youngest child under age 5 and with one more child under age 18 in the household, higher 
educated working women are more likely to spend more hours on total childcare than lower 
educated ones. Additionally, the results show that lower educated immigrant women will spend 
5.301 hours more on total nonmarket work and 5.620 hours less on total leisure time than lower 
educated native women. Higher educated immigrant women are positively associated with total 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































          In this paper, I have documented that native and immigrant women have significantly 
different time allocation with their children. First, on average, immigrant women do not spend as 
much time as native women on total child care, but working immigrant women do spend more 
time with their children on educational child care than working native women. Second, higher 
education levels are related to more hours spent on educational child care for both native women 
and immigrant women. Within the same education level, immigrant women spent more hours on 
educational child care than native women. In general, working immigrant women spend more 
time on educational child care than working native women.  
        Moreover, the results of women’s time use estimation by subcategories conclude that both 
working and non-working immigrant women spent less time on leisure than native women. It is 
interesting that non-working women’s time use is affected by marriage directly. Married non-
working women spend more hours on child care and nonmarket work but fewer hours on leisure 
than other non-working women (including single, widowed, divorced, and separated). Working 
women’s time use is significantly affected by their hourly wages. Working women will work 
more and spend fewer hours on child care, nonmarket work and leisure if they have higher 
hourly wage. Similar to non-working women, married working women will spend more time on 
nonmarket work than other working women as well. Working immigrant women spend more 
time on market work and less time on leisure.  
          Due to the limitation of the data, this paper doesn’t focus on Asian immigrant women’s 
time allocation with children. In the future, Asian immigrant women’s time allocation with 
children should be explored separately since on average Asian races spend significantly more 
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time on childcare. It will be interesting to examine Asian immigrant women’s time allocation 
with their children and their time use categories.  
3.6 Data Appendix 
          In this paper, I use the 2005-2011 American Time Use Surveys (ATUS) for the time 
allocation analysis. The American Time Use Surveys (ATUS), which is reported by the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, provides nationally representative estimates of how individuals age 
15 and over spend their time doing various activities, such as work, childcare, housework, 
watching television, volunteering, and socializing. Generally, the data files include information 
collected from over 148,000 interviews conducted from 2003 to 2013. ATUS data files can be 
linked to data files from the Current Population Survey (CPS), so it offers us more information 
about each individual.  
          This paper restricts the sample to include only those household members who were 
between the age of 21 and 55 with at least one child under age 18 in the household and who had 
a completed 24-hour time dairy. Because this paper tests and compares immigrant women and 
native women’s time allocation with their children, I also limit the household member to be 
women only and separate them into two groups including immigrant women, who were born 
outside the United States, and native women, who were born in the United States. 
          One of the most challenges in comparing the time use data sets with each other is the fact 
that the surveys report time use at differing levels of aggregation. To generate consistent 
measures of time use across the surveys, I sort the raw ATUS data at the level of subcategories 
as in Aguiar and Hurst (2007). In order to render our analysis tractable across the surveys, I 
aggregated an individual’s time allocation into twenty-two categories described in Table 3-9. 
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Each individual’s dairy activities are sorted into four categories, including total child care, total 
market work, total nonmarket work, leisure and others. Within total child care, there are four 
subcategories and they are basic child care, educational child care, recreational child care and 
travel child care. Travel time associated with each activity is embedded in the total time spent on 
the activity, except for child care in which travel for the purpose of child care is considered as a 
separate classification. 
         The raw ATUS data in each of the surveys are reported in units of “minutes per day” 
(totaling 1,440 minutes per day). In this paper, all of the minute-per-day reports are converted to 
hours per week by multiplying the response by 7 and dividing by 60. When presenting the means 
from the raw ATUS data within each demographic cell, the data is weighted by using the 
sampling weights within each of the time use surveys. The weights account for differential 
response rates to ensure the samples are nationally representative. All weights are adjusted so 




Table 3-9 Time Use Classifications. 
Time use classification  Examples of activities included 
Core market work  Work for pay, main job (including time spent working at 
home);work for pay, other jobs 
Total market work  Core market work plus other work-related activities such as 
commuting to/from work; meals/breaks at work; searching for a 
job; applying for unemployment benefits 
Core nonmarket work  Food preparation; food presentation; kitchen/food cleanup; 
washing/drying clothes; ironing; dusting; vacuuming; indoor 
cleaning; indoor painting; etc. 
Shopping/obtaining goods and services Grocery shopping; shopping for other goods; comparison 
shopping; clipping coupons; going to bank; going to post office; 
meeting with lawyer; going to veterinarian; etc. (excluding any 
time spent acquiring medical care) 
Total nonmarket work  Core nonmarket work plus shopping/obtaining goods and 
services plus all other home production including: vehicle 
repair; outdoor repair; outdoor painting; yard work; pet care; 
gardening; etc. 
Education  Taking classes for degree; personal interest courses; homework 
for coursework; research for coursework; etc. 
Sleeping  Sleeping; naps 
Personal care  Grooming; bathing; sex; going to the bathroom; etc. (excluding 
any time spent on own medical care) 
Own medical care  Visiting doctor’s/dentist’s office (including time waiting); 
dressing wounds; taking insulin; etc. 
Eating Eating meals at home; eating meals away from home; etc. 
Basic child care  Breast-feeding; rocking a child to sleep; general feeding; 
changing diapers; providing medical care to child; grooming 
child; etc. 
Educational child care Reading to children; teaching children; helping children with 
homework; attending meetings at a child’s school; etc. 
Recreational child care  Playing games with children; playing outdoors with children; 
attending a child’s sporting event or dance recital; going to the 
zoo with children, taking walks with children; etc. 
Travel child care Driving a child to school, to a doctor, or  to dance practice; etc. 
Sports/exercise  Playing sports; attending sporting events; exercise 
TV  Watching television 
Entertainment (not TV) Going to movies and theater; listening to music; computer use 
for leisure 
Socializing  Attending/hosting social events; playing games; telephone calls 
Reading  Reading books, magazines; personal mail; personal email 
Gardening/pet care Caring for lawn, garden, houseplants, and pets 
Hobbies  Arts and crafts; collecting; playing musical instrument 
Religious/civic activities  Religious practice/participation; fraternal organizations; 




Aguiar, M. a. (2007). Measuring Trends in Leisure: The Allocation of Time Over Five Decades. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(3), 969-1006. 
Becker, G. S. (1965). A Theory of the Allocation of Time. The Economic Journal, 75(299), 493-
517. 
Becker, G S. (1991). A Treatise on the Family. Enl. ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press. 
Bianchi, S. M. (2000, November). Maternal Employment and Time with Chidlren: dramatic 
Change or Surprising Countinuity? Demography, 37, 401-414. 
Bianchi, S. M. (2008, December). Single, Cohabitating, and Married Mothers' Time with 
Children. Journal of Marriage and Family, 70, 1228-1240. 
DebBurman, B. R. (2004). Educational Attainment: Analysis by Immigrant Generation. 
Economics of Education Review, 23(4), 361-379. 
Glick, M. J. (2011). Achieving Anew: How New Immigrants Do in American Schools, Jobs and 
Neighborhoods. Russell Sage Foundation Publications. 
Keane, M. F. (n.d.). How the Allocation of Children's Time Affects Cognitive and Non-
Cognitive Development. Economics Group, Nuffiend College, University of Oxford, number 
2012-W09. 
Jonathan Guryan, E. H. (2008, Summer). Parental Education and Parental Time with Children. 
Journal of    Economic Perspectives, 22(3), 23-46. 
Liana C. Sayer, S. M. (2004, July). Are Parents Investing Less in Children? Trends in Mothers' 
and Fathers' Time with Children. AJS, 110(1), 1-43. 
76 
 
Liana E. Fox, W.-J. H. (2011). Time for Children: Trends in the Employment Patterns of Parents, 
1967-2009. NBER Working Paper No. 17135. 
Sakamoto, A., Kimberly A. G., and ChangHwan K. (2009). Socioeconomic Attainments of 
Asian Americans. Annual Review of Sociology, 35, 255-276. 
Suzanni M. Bianchi, M. A. (2000, September). Is Anyone Doing the Housework? Trends in the 
Gender Division of Household Labor. Social Forces, 79(1), 191-228. 
Teresa Abada, F. H. (2008). Group Differences in Educational Attainment Among the Children 








4.1.1 Immigrants’ Home Ownership 
Every year, the United States attracts a large number of immigrants from all over the world. 
Immigrants have been the main driver of U.S. population growth. According to the Pew 
Research Center projections, 18 percent of the U.S. population will be immigrants in 2065, 
compared with 5 percent in 1965. The growth of immigrants has contributed significantly to the 
growth of the U.S. population.  
Immigrants are not just adding numbers to the population, but also making a sizable 
contribution to the housing market. Immigrants play a very important role on both the demand 
and supply sides of the housing sector. This paper examines the effect of immigrants on home 
ownership, the demand side of the housing sector. According to the data from the 2015 
American Community Survey,  people who were foreign born occupied nearly 17.6 million 
housing units, including 8.9 million owner-occupied housing units and 8.7 million renter-
occupied housing units. Moreover, the Research Institute for Housing America projects that 
immigrants constituted 39 percent of the growth in homeowners from 2000 to 2010 and in the 
decade 2010-2020 immigrants will account for 32.2 percent of the growth in households, 35.7 
percent of the growth in homeowners and 26.4 percent of the growth in renter households.  
Immigrants in this paper refer to pepople who are "foreign-born" in the United States. They 
may be naturalized citizens, legal permanent residents, visa holders or unauthorized immigrants. 
According to the 2015 American Community Survey 1-year estimates, there were 43 million 
immigrants. Of all, 48 percent of them were naturalized citizens, while the rest were not U.S. 
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citizens yet, but they could be legal permanent residents, visa holders or unauthorized 
immigrants. The unauthorized resident immigrant population refers to all foreign-born non-
citizens who are not legal residents, defined by U.S. Department of Homeland Security
13
. U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security estimated that 11.4 million unauthorized immigrants lived in 
the United States in January 2012. Similarly, the Pew Research Center
14
 estimated the total 
number of unauthorized immigrants were 11.1 million in 2014. 
The decision to purchase a house is one of the most important decisions for every family, 
especially for the immigrant’s family. There are many factors that influence the decision to 
purchase a house. The factors that influence native buyers’ decisions also affect immigrants’ 
housing decisions. In addition, immigrants’ housing decisions are also highly correlated with and 
limited by immigration policy, such as E-Verify. 
4.1.2 E-Verify Policy 
E-Verify has been used in certain states since the mid-2000s. Today, E-Verify has been 
used nationwide by more than 600,000 employers of all sizes to verify their employees’ 
eligibility to work legally in the United States. Also, about 1,400 new participating companies 
join E-Verify every week. 
As a free web-based service, E-Verify helps employers verify the employment eligibility of 
newly hired employees. It is administrated by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
USCIS, Verification Division, and the Social Security Administration (SSA). The enacted 
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legislation requires the mandatory use of E-Verify that may include most employers, various 
public entities or contractors.  
Starting in 2008, the Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA) mandates the use of E-Verify in 
Arizona. It requires all employers in Arizona to use E-Verify to confirm the employment 
authorization of all new employees hired after December 31, 2007. E-Verify has been used by 
more states over time. As of 2015, a total of 22 states require employers to verify workers’ 
employment eligibility by using E-Verify
15
. They are: Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, 
Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, 
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia and 
West Virginia.  
In this paper, the research mainly focuses on the states that adopted E-Verify in 2012 and 
before, including Alabama (2011),  Arizona (2007), Colorado (2008), Florida (2011), Georgia 
(2009), Idaho (2009), Indiana (2011), Louisiana (2011), Michigan (2012), Minnesota (2011), 
Mississippi (2008), Missouri (2008), Nebraska (2009), North Carolina (2011), Oklahoma (2007), 
Pennsylvania (2012), South Carolina (2008), Tennessee (2011), Utah (2008), Virginia (2010) 
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Table 4-1 States that Enacted the E-Verify Mandates in 2012 and Before 2012. 
 State Year 
Enacted 
Applies to: 
1 Alabama 2011 
 
All employers (phase in) 
Contractors and subcontractors; prime contractors not liable for subcontractor 
complying with E-Verify unless they know of the violation 
2 Arizona 2007 All employers 
3 Colorado 2008 State agencies, contractors 
4 Florida 2011 State agencies, contractors, subcontractors 
5 Georgia 2009 Public employers, contractors, subcontractors with 500+ employees (phase in) 
6 Idaho 2009 State agencies, contractors 
7 Indiana 2011 State agencies, contractors 
8 Louisiana 2011 State contractors; Option for private employers 
9 Michigan 2012 State agencies, contractors, subcontractors 
10 Minnesota 2011 Contracts in excess of $50,000 require vendors and subcontractors to use E-Verify 
11 Mississippi 2008 All employers (phase in) 
12 Missouri 2008 Public employers, contractors, subcontractors 
13 Nebraska 2009 Public employers, contractors 
14 North 
Carolina 
 2011 State agencies, universities; Localities, all employers (phase in) 
15 Oklahoma 2007 Public employers, contractors, subcontractors 
16 Pennsylvania 2012 Public contractors, subcontractors 
17 South 
Carolina 
2008 Public employers, contractors (phase in) 
18 Tennessee 2011 All employers with 6+ employees (phase in) 
19 Utah 2008 Public employers, contractors, subcontractors 
20 Virginia 2010 State agencies 
21 West Virginia 2012 Public Employers, contractors 
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures
16
. 
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81 
 
This paper aims to examine the housing decisions of immigrants and test how E-Verify 
mandates affect immigrants’ housing decision and the changes in immigrants’ home ownership 
in the states that adopted E-Verify mandates before and after the enacted year. 
The next section discusses the potential effects of E-Verify mandates and previous research 
findings related to E-Verify. The third section explains the data. The fourth section explains the 
empirical methodolgy. The fifth section presents the results and the last section concludes. 
4.2 Potential Effects of E-Verify Mandates and Previous Findings 
As one of the biggest decision in a family, immigrants’ home ownership is affected by 
many factors, such as buyers’ age, employment, household income and immigrant status. There 
are many studies that have shown that E-Verify mandates have negative effects on immigrant 
workers’ employment and incomes, which will affect immigrants’ home ownership eventually. 
E-Verify mandates affect unauthorized immigrant workers’ employment and population. 
Bohn, Lofstrom, and Raphael (2013) find a notable reduction in the proportion of the Hispanic 
noncitizen population in Arizona after the 2007 Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA) 
implemented.  Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak (2012, 2013) conclude that E-Verify mandates, 
particularly those covering all employers, significantly reduced the employment likelihood of 
likely unauthorized male and female workers. Good (2013) finds that the implementation of state 
omnibus immigration legislation was associated with a 24 percent decrease in the population of 
likely unauthorized immigrants, and these states experienced a 10 percent decline in employment 
of likely unauthorized immigrants. Bohn and Lofstrom (2013) examine the impact of E-Verify 
on Arizona's workforce between 2007 and 2009 and find that the state's undocumented 
population declined by about 92,000 people, or about 17 percent, as workers left the state to look 
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for jobs, and also they found there is an increase in the rate of self-employment among likely 
unauthorized immigrants.  
Moreover, some studies present the effects of E-Verify mandates on unauthorized 
immigrant workers’ wages. Orrenius and Zavodny (2014) find that E-Verify reduced average 
hourly earnings among likely unauthorized male Mexican immigrants but increased labor force 
participation and employment among likely unauthorized female Mexican immigrants. Amuedo-
Dorantes and Bansak (2012, 2013) find that E-Verify mandates appeared to have mixed effects 
on wages and may redistribute likely unauthorized labor towards certain industries.  
Most of the previous researches conclude that E-Verify reduced the unauthorized 
immigrant workers’ employments and wages; however, there is less research on the impact of E-
Verify on immigrants’ home ownership in the states that require employers to use E-Verify 
mandates.  
Even though E-Verify intends primarily to prevent illegal immigrant from obtaining 
employment illegally in the United States and reduces the number of unauthorized immigrants 
living in a state, it still has unavoidable and unintended effects on immigrants, including the legal 
immigrants. Some legal immigrants or natives have household members, like siblings, parents, or 
a spouse, who are unauthorized. The legal immigrants or natives may have to leave the state and 
relocate their homes due to the E-Verify mandates’ impact on their unauthorized family 
members.  
The outflow of immigrants’ employment as a result of E-Verify mandates’ impact on 
immigrants may affect the immigrants’ housing market in the states that adopted E-Verify 
mandates. To avoid the impact of E-Verify mandates, immigrants will move out of these states 
that require E-Verify and migrate to other states without such strict immigration policies. It is no 
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doubt that the decline in the number of immigrants in a state will have negative effects on the 
state’s housing demand. 
4.3 Data 
In this paper, I use the American Community Survey (ACS) 1-year estimates during the 
period 2004-2015 to examine the effects of E-Verify mandates on immigrants’ housing decision 
in the states that adopted the E-Verify mandates in 2012 and before 2012 relative to those states 
without mandates. The ACS is nationwide, continuous survey that provides demographic, 
housing social and economic data every year. It covers broad topics about the U.S. population. 
The ACS 1-year estimates used in this paper are very timely and released in the year 
immediately following collection. The ACS contains information on respondents’ personal 
information, such as sex, age, marital status, educational attainments, family income, family 
structure, and origins. These information is very useful for exploring the factors that associated 
with respondents’ housing decisions. 
The ACS data are tabulated for a variety of different geographic areas ranging in size from 
broad geographic regions (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West) to cities, towns, 
neighborhoods, and census block groups. That offers the data all over the different states and 
allows me to examine the states where E-Verify mandates were implemented and distinguish the 
immigrants’ housing decisions in the states that enacted E-Verify mandates and the states 
without E-Verify mandates.  
Moreover, the ACS asks the respondents about the tenure status of households, one of the 
important factors used to determine home ownership. The house, apartment, or mobile home 
may be owned by the respondents or someone in this household, or rented. If a respondent 
reported that he/she owned the house, apartment or mobile home, he/she will be considered as a 
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“home owner”. Financially, home owners may own the home with or without a mortgage or 
loan. In this paper, the tenure status of households is used to distinguish the respondents who 
own a house from the ones who do not own a house in the survey year.  
Immigrants in this paper are defined as people who were not born in the United States, and 
may or may not be naturalized U.S. citizen. Sometimes, they are called as “foreign born”. For 
any household head, if the years he/she lives in the United States is the same as his/her age 
he/she is considered as a native household head, otherwise, he/she is considered as an immigrant 
household head. 
Table 4-2 reports descriptive statistics of the sample. In the sample, it includes 12,896,086 
native household heads and 1,897,688 immigrants who are household heads as well. There are 
several interesting factors that need to be mentioned here. Of all, about 67 percent of native 
household heads are occupied home owners, compared with 55 percent of immigrants’ 
household heads. On average, immigrants have more own children than natives. The average age 
of immigrants is 49 and the average years that immigrants lives in the United States are 31 years, 
which means that, on average, immigrants came to United States when they were 18 years old. 




Figure 4-1 The Sample Distribution of Immigrants’ Home Owners by State. 
 
Table 4-2 Descriptive Statistics 
  Native Immigrants 
  N=12,896,086 N=1,897,688 
  Mean Mean 
Occupied home owner 0.68 0.55 
Age 52.52 48.95 
Marital status 0.61 0.66 
Log income 10.77 10.76 
Less than 15 years 0.36 0.45 
High school graduated 0.20 0.15 
some college 0.23 0.16 
College graduate 0.21 0.24 
Number of own children 0.47 0.76 
Years that lives in U.S. na 31.51 





This paper uses a “difference-in-differences methodology” (DID) to estimate the impact of 
E-Verify mandates on the immigrants’ home ownership status. In general, difference-in-
differences methodology is used to estimate treatment effects comparing the pre- and post-
treatment differences in the outcome of a treatment and a control group. The difference–in-
differences methodology in this paper is used to examine the changes in immigrants’ home 
ownership in the states before and after E-Verify mandates were implemented. So, the pre-
treatment is the period before the enacted year of E-Verify mandates, while the post-treatment is 
the period after the enacted year of E-Verify mandates. The treatment group refers to all the 
states that adopted E-Verify mandates in 2012 and before 2012. There are totally twenty-one 
states, listed in the Table 4-1. The states that did not adopt E-Verify mandates in the specific year 
are all included in the control group. The difference-in-differences methodology is not likely to 
be affected by unobserved heterogeneity or ability bias. Orrenius and Zavodny (2014) used the 
similar approach to examine whether E-Verify mandates affect labor market outcomes among 
Mexican immigrants who are likely to be unauthorized. 
The linear probability model is utilized to estimate the effects of E-Verify mandates on the 
immigrants’ home ownership status with the difference in differences methodology and fixed 
effects. The specification is shown as below: 




  + β4 D
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ist  +  β6 Xist  + β7 Cist  +  
εist          (4.1) 
Where i indexes household head, s indexes state and t indexes time. The dependent 
variable, Yist, is outcome of interest that indicates the home ownership status of household head i. 
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Yist equals to one if a household head i owned the house that he/she lives in, otherwise it equals 







ist  is a dummy variable indicating whether a household head i lives in a state that 
adopted an E-Verify mandate in a specific time. If the state adopted an E-Verify mandate and it 













equals to 0. 
Xist is a vector of control variables indicating the age, educational attainment, marital 
status, gender of the household head, the number of persons and children in the household, the 
logarithm of household income, and a variable indicating the number of years that the household 
head has resided in the United States. The year lives in the United States is set to zero if the 
household head is native-born. Also, Cist controls for state-level business cycle conditions, 
including the average unemployment rate during the previous year; the log of real state GDP per 
capita during the previous year; the natural log of real state government expenditures per capita 
during the previous year; the number of housing permits; and the number of housing starts.  
The regressions also include state and time fixed effects that control for unobservable state- 
or time-specific factors that may affect immigrants’ home ownership status. The data is weighted 
using the ACS person’s weight for generating statistics on individuals. 
         The approach used in this chapter assumes that whether a state adopts an E-Verify mandate 
is unrelated to factors that affect immigrants’ home ownership in the state after controlling for 
business cycle conditions in the state. It means that it assumes that E-Verify mandates are 
exogenous.  
The research examines the effects of E-Verify mandates on immigrants’ home ownership 
in the states that adopted E-Verify mandates relative to states that do not. First of all, I examine 
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the factors that affect immigrants’ home ownership without treatment. Then, using the DID 
methodology, I check the effects of E-Verify mandates on immigrants’ home ownership. The 







ist  examines how immigrants’ home ownership status changes in the states before and 
after the effective year. At last, the effects of E-Verify mandates on immigrants’ labor force 
participation and earnings are examined as well. 
4.5 Results 
Table 4-3 presents the results of the key factors that affect immigrants’ housing decisions 
without the effect of E-Verify mandates.  
In the regression (1) and (2), the sample includes all people. In general, age, marital status, 
educational attainments, household income, and the number of own children are the important 
factors that affect people’s decision to buy a home. The results show that people are more likely 
to own a home as they get older. Definitely, marriage is a plus for home ownership. Also, the 
results present that higher educational attainments, higher household income, and more own 
children have positive effects on people’s housing decision and they are more likely to own a 
home.  
Importantly, when immigrants are controlled in the regression (1), the results show that, 
holding all else constant, compared with natives, immigrants, who were not born in the United 
States, are 54.6 percentage points less likely to be home owners in the United States, even they 







Table 4-3 The Effect of Key Factors on Home Ownership Without Treatment 
  ALL  Immigrants Only 
  N=14,793,774 N=14,793,774 N=1,897,688 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable: if the household head owns the occupied house  
Age 0.157*** 0.153*** 0.135*** 
  (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.0001) 
Age square -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Marital status 0.970*** 0.927*** 0.723*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0004) 
Log income 0.773*** 0.786*** 0.832*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
High school graduated 0.271*** 0.375*** 0.163*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
Some college 0.348*** 0.475*** 0.321*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0006) 
College graduate 0.530*** 0.626*** 0.401*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
Number of own children 0.088*** 0.075*** 0.153*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Immigrants -0.546*** na na 
  (0.0002) 
 
  
Years in U.S. na na 0.042*** 
      (0.00001) 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
  Notes: Each cell represents a separate linear probability regression. The regressions include controls for 
individual characteristics, the state business cycle, and state and time fixed effects. Standard errors are shown in 
the parentheses. Regression (1) includes all of the household heads with a control of immigrants; regression (2) 
includes all of the household heads without a control of immigrants; and regression (3) only includes the 
household heads who are immigrants (foreign born). 
 
 
The sample in the regression (3) of the Table 4-3 includes immigrants only. In the 
regression (3), the results show the factors that affect immigrants’ home ownership. Obviously, 
immigrants are more likely to own a home when they get older. Similar to the results from the 
regression (1) and (2), marital status and household income increase immigrants’ home 
ownership. Holding all else constant, immigrants who are married are 72 percentage points more 
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likely to own a home than the ones who are not married. For immigrants, the possibility of 
owning a home will increase significantly as household income increases. Moreover, the years in 
the United States is another important factor that affect immigrants’ home ownership. The results 
present that the longer they live in the United States, the more likely they will be home owners. 
Living in the United States longer means that they are getting older, may get married, have more 
children, be well-educated, find a decent job, earn more money and have more reasons to settle 
down. 
Table 4-4 shows the effects of E-Verify mandates on immigrants’ home ownership. The 
results from the regression (1) show that marriage, income, education and number of own 
children are all positively associated with people’s home ownership; however, E-Verify 
mandates and immigrant status negatively affect people’s home ownership. Immigrants are 54.6 
percentage points less likely to own a home than natives, holding all else constant. In general, 
people living in the states with E-Verify mandates are 1.7 percentage points less likely to own a 
home than the ones living in the states without the treatment. In other words, immigrants are half 
as likely to own a home as natives, but E-Verify mandates reduces immigrant home ownership 
even further. 
The regression (2) only includes immigrants. It is obvious that E-Verify mandates reduce 
the possibility of immigrants’ home ownership. In the states that adopted E-Verify mandates, 
immigrants are 2.2 percentage points less likely to own a home than the ones in the states 
without E-Verify mandates. Like marriage, education, income and the number of own children, 
the years living in the United States positively affect immigrants’ home ownership. Thus, 
immigrants, who are living in the United State one more year, are 4.4 percentage points more 
likely to own a home than others.  
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Table 4-4 The Effect of E-Verify Mandates on Immigrants' Home Ownership  
  All Immigrants Only 
  N=14,793,774 N=1,897,688 N=1,897,688 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable: if the household head owns the occupied house   
TREATMENT -0.017*** -0.022*** -0.028*** 
  -0.0003 (0.0009) (0.0012) 
Age 0.157*** 0.134*** 0.134*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Age square -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Marital status 0.970*** 0.723*** 0.723*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Log income 0.773*** 0.832*** 0.832*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
High school graduated 0.272*** 0.163*** 0.162*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Some college 0.348*** 0.321*** 0.321*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
College graduate 0.530*** 0.402*** 0.401*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Number of own children 0.088*** 0.153*** 0.153*** 




  (0.0002) 
 
  





















      (0.0014) 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
  Notes: Each cell represents a separate linear probability regression with the treatment. The regressions 
include controls for individual characteristics, the state business cycle, and state and time fixed effects. 
Standard errors are shown in the parentheses. Regression (1) includes all of the household heads; regression 
(2) only includes the household heads who are immigrants (foreign born); and regression (3) is the robustness 





Regression (3) illustrates the results of the robustness check with three leads. Each lead 
presents the pre-effect of E-Verify mandates on immigrants’ home ownership. For example, 
“Lead 1” is a dummy variable including one year before the effective year of E-Verify mandates. 
“Lead 2” is a dummy variable including two years before the effective year of E-Verify 
mandates. “Lead 3” is a dummy variable including three years before the effective year of E-
Verify mandates. The results show that E-Verify mandates have negative effects on immigrants’ 
home ownership. Also, among all three leads, lead 1 has a negative coefficient, both lead 2 and 
lead 3 have significantly positive coefficients.  
Prior to E-Verify, immigrants’ home ownership is increasing, and then in the year before 
E-Verify mandates were adopted immigrants’ home ownership decreases. It could be that 
immigrants are reacting to the announcement in anticipation of the policy. In some of the 
treatment states (i.e. AL, FL, MI and PA
17
), before E-Verify mandates were enforced in the 
whole states, some cities/counties in the states already started to use E-Verify mandates to verify 
the worker eligibility for all new hires. And also, for example, Florida enacted an E-Verify 
mandate in 2011. However, during 2010 campaign for governor, Republican Rick Scott stated on 
his website under the border security section that he would "require all Florida employers to use 
the free E-Verify system to ensure that their workers are legal." Even though E-Verify mandates 
were not yet adopted in the states, the pre-announcements, news, or signs already gave 
immigrants in the states that are more likely to adopt E-Verify mandates a warning and they 
adjusted their demand for housing accordingly. The effect of E-Verify mandates significantly 
reduced home ownership and the decline in immigrants’ home ownership in the year before E-
Verify mandates were adopted is predictable. 
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Moreover, in order to check reverse causality, I test whether a state implements E-Verify is 
related to the size of immigrants’ home ownership. All the data was sorted into state level.  
Instead of using a dummy variable for immigrants’ home ownership, I use the share of 
immigrants that own homes as a dependent variable. Control variables indicate the age, 
educational attainment, marital status, gender of the household head, the number of persons and 
children in the household, the logarithm of household income, and the number of years that the 
household head has resided in the United States. The regressions also include the log of state real 
GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, housing permits, housing starts, and the log of real state 
government expenditures per capita (all lagged 1 year); state and year fixed effects; and state-
specific linear time trends. Observations are weighted using the sum of the person weights. The 
same method is also used by Orrenius and Zavody (2016) to address whether increases in the 
population of likely unauthorized immigrants caused states to adopt an E-Verify law in their 
paper. As shown in Table 4-5, the result confirms the previous assumption that whether a state 
implements E-Verify is not related to the size of immigrants’ home ownership. Thus, there is no 




Table 4-5 Reverse Causality Test  
Dependent Variable: Whether a state adopted E-Verify mandate 
Independent Variables:   
The share of immigrants -7.528 
  (4.6885) 
Age -2.195*** 
  (0.2232) 
Age square 0.028*** 
  (0.0022) 
Marital status -4.200** 
  (2.1183) 
Log income 4.004*** 
  (0.8387) 
High school graduated -40.065*** 
  (1.833) 
Some college -63.200*** 
  (2.2502) 
College graduate -8.800*** 
  (1.0578) 
Number of own children -0.495 
  (0.8429) 
Years in U.S. 0.560*** 
  (0.0622) 
Sample Size 612 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
 Notes: These data are based on state averages. The regression includes the log of state real GDP 
per capita, the unemployment rate, housing permits, housing starts, and the log of real state 
government expenditures per capita (all lagged 1 year); state and year fixed effects; and state-
specific linear time trends. Observations are weighted using the sum of the person weights. 
Standard errors are robust and clustered on state. 
Using the state level data, I also test the impact of the share of immigrants on the share of 
home ownership and E-Verify impact on the share of immigrants’ home ownership. The results 
reveal that the share of immigrants is negatively associated with the share of home ownership 
and E-Verify mandates have significantly negative effects on the share of immigrants’ home 
ownership, confirming the previous results from individual level analysis. The results are shown 
in Appendix Table 4-8 and Table 4-9. 
95 
 
Additionally, Table 4-6 and Table 4-7 present the effects of E-Verify mandates on labor 
force participation. The results show that E-Verify mandates negatively effects on immigrants’ 
labor force participation significantly, meaning E-Verify mandates reduce immigrants’ labor 
force participation in the state that adopted E-Verify mandates. In the states that adopted E-
Verify mandates, immigrants are 2.5 percentage points less likely to join the labor force than the 
ones in the states without E-Verify mandates. 
Table 4-6 The Effect of Key Factors on Labor Force Participation Without Treatment 
  ALL  Immigrants Only 
  N=14,793,774 N=14,793,774 N=1,897,688 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable: Labor Force Participation 
Age 0.138*** 0.139*** 0.241*** 
  (0.000034) (0.000034) (0.000094) 
Age square -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** 
  (0.0000003381) (0.000000338) (0.0000009653) 
Marital status -0.547*** -0.523*** -0.472*** 
  (0.000185) (0.000184) (0.000481) 
Log income 0.804*** 0.795*** 0.693*** 
  (0.000093) (0.000092) (0.00023) 
High school graduated 0.373*** 0.303*** 0.231*** 
  (0.000315) (0.00031) (0.00068) 
Some college 0.447*** 0.365*** 0.237*** 
  (0.000316) (0.000309) (0.000709) 
College graduate 0.544*** 0.477*** 0.338*** 
  (0.000332) (0.000327) (0.000698) 
Number of own children -0.139*** -0.129*** -0.132*** 
  (0.00009) (0.00009) (0.000198) 
Immigrants 0.347*** na na 
  (0.000242) 
 
  
Years in U.S. na na -0.011*** 
      (0.000018) 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
Notes: Each column represents a separate linear probability regression. The regressions include controls for 
individual characteristics, the state business cycle, and state and time fixed effects. Standard errors are shown in the 
parentheses. Regression (1) includes all of the household heads with a control of immigrants; regression (2) includes 
all of the household heads without a control of immigrants; and regression (3) only includes the household heads 




Table 4-7 The Effect of E-Verify Mandates on Labor Force Participation 
  All Immigrants Only 
  N=14,793,774 N=1,897,688 N=1,897,688 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable: Labor Force Participation    
TREATMENT -0.02*** -0.025*** -0.02*** 
  (0.000326) (0.00106) (0.00161) 
Age 0.137*** 0.241*** 0.241*** 
  (0.000034) (0.000094) (0.000094) 
Age square -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
  (0.0000003381) (0.0000009653) (0.0000009654) 
Marital status -0.547*** -0.472*** -0.472*** 
  (0.000185) (0.000481) (0.000481) 
Log income 0.804*** 0.693*** 0.693*** 
  (0.000093) (0.00023) (0.00023) 
High school graduated 0.373*** 0.231*** 0.230*** 
  (0.000315) (0.00068) (0.00068) 
Some college 0.448*** 0.237*** 0.237*** 
  (0.000316) (0.000709) (0.00071) 
College graduate 0.544*** 0.338*** 0.338*** 
  (0.000332) (0.000698) (0.000699) 
Number of own children -0.139*** -0.132*** -0.132*** 




  (0.000242) 
 
  





















      (0.00171) 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
  Notes: Each cell represents a separate linear probability regression with the treatment. The regressions include 
controls for individual characteristics, the state business cycle, and state and time fixed effects. Standard errors are 
shown in the parentheses. Regression (1) includes all of the household heads; regression (2) only includes the 
household heads who are immigrants (foreign born); and regression (3) is the robustness check with three leads only 




In terms of earnings, the results with E-Verify mandates are not statistically significant for 
all immigrants. Similarly, Orrenuis and Zavodny (2014) found that earning increase only among 
Mexican men who are naturalized U.S. citizens and U.S. born Hispanics, the other results are not 
significant. Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak (2012) point out that the mandates lower wages 
among male likely unauthorized immigrants and increase wages among female likely 
unauthorized immigrants. It seems that earning impacts on immigrants are closely driven by the 
selection of group of people.  Earnings may fall for unauthorized immigrant workers in the state 
that adopted E-Verify but rise for workers who are substitutes for unauthorized immigrant 
workers, such as naturalized citizens. So, when I test the earning impact on ALL immigrants, the 
results show no significant effects on earnings, which is consistent with other researchers’ 
results.  
4.6 Conclusions 
E-Verify mandates are used to help employers verify the employment eligibility of newly 
hired employees, and reduce the unauthorized immigrant workers in the United States. However, 
based on the previous research and the results illustrated above, E-Verify mandates not only 
affect the unauthorized immigrant workers’ employment, but also have negative impacts on all 
immigrants’ home ownership. Immigrants living in the states that adopted E-Verify mandates are 
less likely to own homes, or purchase houses there. There are couple explanations for the results. 
It could be that it works through the effect on income. Alternatively, it could be that E-Verify 
mandates creates uncertainty and hostility making immigrants less likely to commit to living in 
the state that adopted E-Verify mandates. 
As E-Verify becomes more and more popular, the impact of E-Verify mandates on 
immigrants’ housing decisions are unavoidable. It will be interesting to explore other effects of 
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E-Verify mandates and examine how E-Verify mandates affect immigrants in different ways. For 
example, E-Verify may cause the outflow of immigrants who living in the states that adopted E-
Verify mandates and the inflow of immigrants in other states. It may be possible to track the 
relocation of immigrants from one state to other state and examine how E-Verify mandates 




Table 4-8 The Impact of the Share of Immigrants on Home Ownership 
Dependent Variable: The Share of Home Ownership 
Independent Variables:  
The share of immigrants -0.142** 
  (0.0602) 
Age 0.034*** 
  (0.0054) 
Age square -0.0003*** 
  (0.0001) 
Marital status 0.456*** 
  (0.0663) 
Log income 0.081** 
  (0.0215) 
High school graduated 0.058** 
  (0.0223) 
Some college -0.008 
  (0.0235) 
College graduate 0.019 
  (0.0219) 
Number of own children -0.124*** 
  (0.0303) 
Years in U.S. -0.001 
  (0.0022) 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
Notes: The regression includes the log of state real GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, housing 
permits, housing starts, and the log of real state government expenditures per capita (all lagged 1 year); 
state and year fixed effects; and state-specific linear time trends. Observations are weighted using the sum 





Table 4-9 With and Without E-Verify Effect on the Share of Immigrants Home 
Ownership 
Dependent Variable: The Share of Home Ownership   
All Population Immigrants Only 
Independent Variables: 
The Share of Immigrants 0.469*** TREATMENT -0.004*** 
  (0.0438)   (0.0013) 
Age -0.002 Age 0.0005 
  (0.0039)   (0.0025) 
Age square -0.000 Age square -0.000 
  (0.00004)   (0.00002) 
Marital status 0.277*** Marital status 0.120*** 
  (0.04824)   (0.0249) 
Log income -0.005 Log income 0.005 
  (0.0157)   (0.0088) 
High school graduated -0.058*** High school graduated 0.024 
  (0.0163)   (0.0147) 
Some college -0.085*** Some college -0.062*** 
  (0.0171)   (0.0150) 
College graduate -0.023 College graduate 0.028*** 
  (0.0159)   (0.0099) 
Number of own children -0.030 Number of own children -0.006 
  (0.0220)   (0.0084) 
Years in U.S. 0.002 Years in U.S. 0.001** 
  (0.0016)   (0.0008) 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
Notes: The regression includes the log of state real GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, 
housing permits, housing starts, and the log of real state government expenditures per capita (all 
lagged 1 year); state and year fixed effects; and state-specific linear time trends. Observations are 
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